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Translations  of  work by Fichte have often been modified,  with  Bergson very 
rarely so, as he authorised many of the translations of the Œuvres personally. This has 
not   always   been   noted   in   the   text.  All  work  not   existing   in   translation  has   been 
translated by myself.
Immanuel Kant:




­  Critique of Pure Reason  (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press,  
1997), edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Woods
KU ­  Kritik  der Urteilskraft  [1790] (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001)  
edited  by Heiner  F.  Klemme;   'Erste  Einleitung'  to  KU  in  Kant's  




























WLnm ­  Wissenschaftslehre   nova  methodo,  Kollegnachtschrift   K.  Chr.  Krausse  
[1798/99] (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982, zweite verbesserte Auflage,  
1994), edited by Erich Fuchs
­  Foundations   of   Transcendental   Philosophy   (Wissenschaftslehre)   nova  

































­  The  Creative  Mind  (New York:  Kensington Publishing  Corp.,  2002),  
translated by Mabelle L. Andison
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that   set  nature   in  motion,   and  all   positions  of   all   items  of  which  nature   is 























2 Laplace, Pierre Simon,  A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, translated from the 6th French 
edition  by  Frederick  Wilson  Truscott  and  Frederick  Lincoln  Emory,  (New  York:  Dover 
Publications, 1951 [1814]), 4.
3 See the Third Antinomy in Immanuel Kant,  Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Nach der ersten und  
zweiten  Original-Ausgabe.,  ed.  H.  Klemme (Hamburg:  Felix  Meiner  Verlag,  1990 [1781/87]), 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  trans.  A.  Woods  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997). 
Hereafter abbreviated to KrV with A for the 1st edition and B for the 2nd edition. This reference: 






deterministic   science  must   be   questioned.   As   the  well­known  mathematician   Von 
Neuman once said: "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random 
digits is, of course, in a state of sin."4 For indeed what is a randomly produced number? 
Mathematics   itself   is   fundamentally   incapable   of   conceiving,   or   producing   such   a 








of   these  processes   are   in   themselves   random or   indetermined.  Dice   function   as   a 
random number generator for us, but that is simply because we do not know all the 




4 Von  Neuman  "Various  Techniques  Used  in  Connection  With  Random  Digits",  Applied 
Mathematics Series, no. 12, 1951, 36–8.
5 Barring the use of processes that are themselves organic in nature, such as the appearance of 
bubbles at a surface, events the status of which is precisely what is to be determined.
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be a very complex phenomenon result from what are in fact very simple, but very many 

















6 See Daniel C. Dennett Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking press, 2003).
7 Arthur Schopenhauer Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, translated by E.F.J. Payne, based 
on the 2nd edition from 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
8 See Frank Jackson 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 127 (April, 
1982), 127-36, for the original formulation of the problem. For his later retraction see Frank 
Jackson, 'Postscript on "What Mary didn't know"',  in  Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, P. 











can   attest   to,   we   will   have   to   delve   deeper   into   this   conflict   of   freedom   and 










9 For what sense can we make of something said to be caused by natural events, but that in turn 
has  no effect  on such events?  Thomas Henry  Huxley is  credited with the comparison of  an 
epiphenomenon with that of the steam whistle, which contributes nothing to the locomotion of 
the  engine.  But  this  is  both  patently  false  (for  by  releasing  steam  it  does  impact  on  the 
locomotion of the engine) but even more so, it does not make of the steam a non-natural event.  
In an interesting case of family history, 30 years later grandson Julian Huxley tried to ridicule 
Bergson’s metaphor of an élan vital by saying that, if that were so, then a train must surely be 
propelled by an élan locomotive.
15
not  discuss   is  why  and  how determinism  is  unable   to  account   for  a   real   sense  of 
freedom.  We  will   offer   an   in­depth   analys   of   determinism   nor   will   we   offer   an 
immanent critique of  it   to show why it  is unable to account for freedom. This  is a  
weakness of the thesis that could only have been avoided if a correspondingly large 









different  kinds  of  determinism and  yet   still   formulate  a   largely   similar  alternative. 
Whereas   for   Bergson   determinism   was   found  mostly   in   various   branches   of   the 









until   Section   5   below,   for  we   first   need   to   clarify   the   idea   of   an   alternative   to 
determinism.
3. Kant and the spontaneity of consciousness
A  key   term   in   the   alternative   to   determinism   that   I  will   attempt   to   formulate   is 
spontaneity.  Although   Kant   was  most   certainly   not   the   first   to   have   noticed   the 
importance   of   this   term,   he  was   the   first   to   posit   it   as   the   prime   transcendental 
condition   of   all   experience.   Yet   Kant's   opponent   cannot   strictly   be   said   to   be 
determinism and he did not set out to demonstrate the reality of freedom in the world. 
Rather, his problem was of epistemological nature: how can we demonstrate that there 
is   sure  and certain  knowledge? How do we show  that  knowledge has  a  necessary 
structure and is informed by experience? That is, how are synthetic a priori judgments 
possible? We know Kant's solution to this question: we need to distinguish between the 































10 Robert Pippin "Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind." Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17:2 (1987), 
474 and 451 resp.  See also the interesting new work on spontaneity by Marco Sgarbi,  e.g. , 
“Spontaneity  from  Leibniz  to  Kant.  Sources  and  studies,”  in  Einheit  in  der  Vielheit:  XII.  
Internationaler  Leibniz-Kongress,  ed.  Herbert  Berger  and  Jürgen  Herbst  (Hannover:  Leibniz 
Gesellschaft, 2006); “The spontaneity of mind in Kant's Transcendental Logic,” Fenomenologia e 
società XXXII, no. 2 (2009): 19-28.
11 Pippin op. cit., 449 and 452 resp.





















13 Pippin  does  discuss  Fichte  in  Chapter  III  ‘Fichte’s  Contribution’  to  his Hegel’s  Idealism. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 42-59. The reading relies heavily on both Hegel 
and Henrich and although containing a few interesting comments,  is  not  very useful  to our 
discussion. E.g., although he says he is not following Henrich’s reading of self-positing as self-
identification (p. 49), he later makes exactly this point when talking about the “I=I” (p. 54). In 
this thesis I give an alternative account of the argument from the  Foundations. The “I=I” is 
shown not to concern self-identification, but to be part of a heuristic argument by Fichte intent 
to bring to us to understand self-positing. Pippin does not adequately grasp how self-positing has 
an internal relation to opposition and reciprocal determination. Hence he falsely concludes that 
Fichte has no account of the “co-originality” of identity and difference (p. 55). This thesis aims to  



















found   in   the   mere   interaction   of   things   alone   but   an   essential   contribution   by 
14 In a private meeting with Isaac Benrubi Bergson remembers how as a young man he wanted to 
"react  energetically  against  the  then  reigning  Kantianism".  See  Isaac  Benrubi  "Souvenirs 
personnels  d'un entretien  avec  Bergson"  in Henri  Bergson.  Essais  et  témoignages recueillis 
(Neuchatel: Éditions de la Baconnière) Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, eds., 368-9. And in 
another private meeting related in that same collection Bergson tells Jean de la Harpe that his 
friends at the École Normale used to call him "l'anti-kantien",  see Jean de la Harpe "Souvenirs 
Personnels" in op. cit., 359













the   first  Critique,   is   what,   in  my  mind   at   least,   constitutes   the   true   Copernican 
Revolution.18 For Fichte and most people in his day it meant that freedom was now at 
work in the very heart of philosophy. For what else but freedom could allow for such a  





16 As Ralph C.S. Walker notes, crucial to transcendental arguments is to show that all experience 
requires  synthesis  (KrV  A77 /  B103):  "[Kant]  argues  also  that  even  where  judgment  is  not 
involved, in the most elementary kind of concept-application and in pre-conceptual awareness, 
synthesis  is  still  required  and  must  be  category-governed  (B  161)."  See  "Kant  and 
Transcendental Arguments", in The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Paul Guyer (ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008,  244.
17 Kritik der Urteilskraft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001 [1790]) edited by Heiner F. Klemme; 
translation: Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
hereafter abbreviated to KU.
18 See e.g.,  KrV A 126 where Kant equates the understanding with spontaneity of  cognition,  a 
faculty for thinking, a faculty for concepts, a faculty for judgments and, finally, a faculty for rules.
21
philosophy and this we will discuss in Chapter I, Section 1.2. He asked, what is the first  
principle   of   transcendental   philosophy?   In   its   demand   for   a   foundation  Reinhold's 
philosophy might appear to us as a return to a form of philosophy made obsolete by 
precisely  Kant  himself.  Whether   or  not   this   is   so,   the   implications   insofar   as   they 




The importance of spontaneity as  first  principle  for an alternative account of 





Reinhold's  demand   for   a   first  principle,  will   attempt   to   formulate   a  philosophy  of 
freedom. The spontaneous activity of thinking, understood by Fichte as a "self­positing 
I", will be explicitly presented as an alternative to determinism.
19 See  Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre,  in  Sämmtliche Werke I  (Berlin:  Walter  de 
Gruyter, 1845);  translation in  Johann Gottlieb Fichte,  Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre 
and Other Writings (1797-1800), trans. Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1994). Hereafter abbreviated to ZE. Here: ZE 454, 513 / 37, 98. See also  Bernard Bourgeois, 
L'idéalisme  de  Fichte (Paris:  Vrin,  1995  [1966]),  1-2;  Reinhard  Lauth,  Die  Entstehung  von 
Schellings  Identitätsphilosophie  in  der  Auseinandersetzung  mit  Fichtes  Wissenschaftslehre 
(München: K.A. Freiburg Verlag, 1975), 38- 41;  Alexis Philonenko, “Une lecture fichtéenne du 
















attempt   to  demonstrate   that   that  which  determinism claims  as   its  domain may  be 
accounted for within "freedom". 







































hand,   to   agree   with   the   skeptical   critique   of   the   dogmatic   claim   to   immediate 








appears   with   the   (empirical)   object   in   a   genetic   progress   he   called   "reciprocal 
determination"   (Wechselbestimmung,  GWL   131   /   12720).   The  empirical  distinction 
between a subject of knowledge and an object of knowledge should not be transposed 
into a transcendental distinction between a subject and an unknown object existing 
independently  of  each other.  This  principle  of  reciprocal  determination  is  equally  a 
principle of division because it involves an originary division of subject and object. As 
such the principle of reciprocal determination is a principle of the continuity of matter 
20 Johann Gottlieb Fichte  Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre [1794/95] in  Sämmtliche 
Werke I, translation  in idem The Science of Knowledge (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 








organisation,   or   processes   if   you   will,   that   combine   in   varying   degrees.   Bergson 
attempted to explain why what we may call a mind­body or spirit­matter split arises, 
and to show how all life is always already composed of "mind­body" or "spirit­matter",  
but composed in varying  degrees  or  nuances.21 As the analysis  in this thesis aims to 
demonstrate duration, as a principle of life, has certain qualities that make it operate in 
a similar vein to Fichte's appeal to spontaneity. Indeed, for Bergson the creative effort of 
life   is  spontaneous.  We may,   for   instance,  say  that  duration  is   "simple"  rather   than 
complex, yet allowing for differentiation, in the words of Jankélevitch "plutôt indivisible  
que indivise", indivisible rather than undivided.22 Hence it may be compared to Fichte's 




21 Gilles Deleuze speaks of this notion of the nuance as being the essence of psychical life. See his  
early “Bergson's  Conception  of  Difference,”  in  The  New  Bergson,  ed.  John  Mullarkey 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 46.
22 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 40.
26
made   concerning   "production"),   in   that   it   concerns  real   change  in   the   world, 
comparable   to   the  Tathandlung  as   "performative   action".23  Bergson   introduces   the 
notion of duration somewhat hesitantly at first, but as his thought develops, all of life is  
progressively   seen  as  durational,   something   that   continuously   "makes   itself".  Fichte 












material   decay,   is   at   the   same   time   constantly   "making   itself".   The  making   and 















as  first  principle (my term, not  his)  duration differentiates  itself  and that  this  self­
differentiation is what allows us explain the phenomenon of things­like entities. Fixed 
things with clear  outlines,  self­subsistent   individuals;   this   is  something Bergson can 
account for as phenomenon. He offers an explanation of how things appear, but not of 
why  things appear. That is, things remain a manifestation of a principle that is itself 











a   certain   reading   of   both   authors  with  which   not   everyone  will   be   comfortable. 
Especially as concerns Bergson this will make him into much more of a Kantian than is 
sometimes liked. However, as this will allow us to understand more clearly the internal 
development   of   Bergson’s   thought   and   the   precise   problem   that   faces   him  when 




of   experience   (EE,   425­6   /   11).24  When   the   choice   is   between   determinism   and 
spontaneity, the thesis chooses spontaneity.
Although a full  analysis  of  the shortcomings of determinism falls  outside the 
scope of this thesis a few words will have to be said. What I refer to with the umbrella  
term   “determinism”   I,   in   fact,   take   to   consist   of   the   following   three   dogmas.   1.) 





may  be  considered a   subsidiary  claim).  2.)  Mechanism:  Objects   combine   in  purely 
24 Erste Einleitung in Sämmtliche Werke I, transl. in Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre. Abbr. 
to EE.
29
mechanical   fashion,   that   is   to   say,   they  may   combine   and   recombine  without   the 




elements.  The combination of  elements   is  mechanical  and determined by universal 
laws. This together makes up the complex world we perceive.







How to account  for  ecology? Determinism provides very  little  with which  to 
think   in  dynamic   fashion   the   relations  between  individual  and  society,  or  between 
species   and   environment.   Adaptation   needs   to   be   re­conceptualised   as  reciprocal 
adaptation. Secondly, causality. How does one thing lead to another? Determinism must 














philosophers,   and   quite   different   at   that,   that   have   really   attempted   to   think 
relationally.  They both start  with  the  whole  of   experience  to  then see how relations 
appear and how identities appear from within relations. If we keep this is mind then we 
should   be   able   to   look   past   their   very   real   differences,   to   see   where   they   are 


















start   with   an   original   and   spontaneous   act   of   synthesis   as   prime   transcendental 
condition, this may then be seen to result  in an empirical subject and an empirical 
object. In this sense the "thing" will have to be derived from "consciousness". But Fichte 









as   they   are   and   that   they   determine   experience   and   thus   that   something   like 









incorporation? This need must be one that is  internal  to  life, only in this way can it 
strictly speaking be a necessity for  life. In terms a transcendental philosophy of life, if 
we have shown that experience (the empirical) can only be understood on the basis of 







This   is   a   problem   for   Fichte   and   a   problem   for   Bergson.   Although   the 
surrounding  debates  were  very  different   they   share   this   fundamental  philosophical 
challenge. That the charge of idealism worried Bergson until the very end of his life  
may   be   clearly   seen   from   a   footnote   he   added   in   1934   to   the   re­edition   of  An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, making it one of the very last things he allowed to appear 




affirm   the   persistence   of   existences.   And   I   believe   I   have   facilitated   their 
representation. How was it ever possible to compare this doctrine to Heraclitus? 
(IM, 1420n / 38n).25
What   worried   Bergson   was   that   people   considered   his   philosophy   a   form   of 
Heraclitianism, a form of idealistic dynamism. He worried that people thought he had 
only   inverted  determinism.  Yet  he   felt   he  had  facilitated  the  understanding  of   the 
persistence of existences.
Fichte is less explicit and at one point even seems to deny the very possibility of 
what   I  am about  to  attempt.  He writes   in  the  First   Introduction  that  necessity  and 
freedom are two different principles that can never be combined:
Anyone who wishes to challenge this claim must establish the possibility of such 







25 Introduction à la métaphysique in Henri Bergson, Œuvres (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 
1959) this is the 1934 edition. Transl. after the 1st edition in Henri Bergson, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics,  ed.  J.  Mullarkey  and  M.  Kolkman,  trans.  T.E.  Hulme  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007a). Abbr. to IM.
It was Jacques Maritain who compared Bergson to Heraclitus in his Bergsonian Philosophy and 
Thomism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). This work first appeared in 
1913 and was re-edited with a new Preface in 1931, hence just prior to the publication of in 1934 
of The Creative Mind that included the subtly edited edition of IM. Maritain compares Bergson 
with Heraclitus on a number of occasions, see e.g., 174-5, 278. Bergson appended the footnote 
to The Creative Mind version. This makes it one of the very last things that Bergson allowed in 







to  philosophy.  There   is  a  wealth  of   information  concerning   the   scientific   literature 
Bergson   consulted;   indeed,   Bergson   is   probably   unparalleled   in   the   history   of 
philosophy for the rigour and scope of the empirical data analysed.26 But as has been 
remarked more than once, there is  a real lack and a need to know the  philosophical 
references of  his  work.27  Bergson really only mentions very  few philosophers  in his 
work and even then it is generally to characterise their work with just a line or so.  
Again,  Kant  and Zeno aside,  who both   significantly  appear   in  Time and Free  Will,  






26 Of the 108 names that are listed in the index of names in the new critical edition of  Creative 
Evolution, a rough count of philosophers came to 14. See Bergson L'évolution créatrice, (Paris: 
PUF, 2008) Le choc Bergson, Frédéric Worms ed. Dossier critique by Arnaud François.
27 See Philip Soulez's 'Presentation' to  Henri Bergson, “Fichte (cours inédit),” in  Fichte, Octave 
Hamelin and Henri Bergson (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1988), hereafter 
abbreviated to FCI, 148, who also cites Deleuze's Bergsonism on this point.
28 Henri Bergson, L'évolution créatrice, in Œuvres, translation in Creative Evolution, ed. K. Ansell-
Pearson,  M.  Kolkman, and M. Vaughan, trans.  A.  Mitchell  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007). Hereafter abbreviated to EC. See EC 656-7, 797 / 122-3, 228. An implicit reference is the 









For we know that,  at   least as concerns Spencer,   it  cannot be by chance that 
Bergson   mentions   him.   Indeed,   the   young   Bergson   was   quite   the   follower   of 
Spencer.29  Spencer   advocated   a   form   of   evolutionary   determinism,   the   very   thing 







argument  that  Fichte and Spencer  are  juxtaposed "haphazardly".  This  confrontation 
takes place in the opening section on "The Method in Philosophy". The third chapter is 
the   first  moment  when,   after   the  preparatory  work  of   the   two  preceding   chapters 
Bergson  will   attempt   to   show   how,   from   the   newly   opened   ground,  matter   and 
knowledge may be seen to co­originate (see EC 493­4 / xxxviii­ix). Bergson wants to  
"Introduction (Deuxième Partie)" in   La pensée et le mouvant  in  Œuvres,  hereafter abbr. to PM. 
Translation: 'Introduction: Part II'  in  Henri Bergson,  The Creative Mind, trans. Andison, M.L. 
(New York: Citadel Press, 2002). See PM, 1290 / 48.
29 Jean de la Harpe, 1943, 358-9.
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demonstrate   the   "dual   genesis"   of   matter   and   knowledge,   because   only   if   we 
understand how matter and knowledge co­originate can the question of the relativity of 
knowledge finally be solved. This, Bergson states explicitly in Matter and Memory, is a 











the   forms  of   thought   co­evolved    with   life   itself   then   they   could   be   shown  to  be 
adequate  to life. Now, as Deleuze comments in 1960, lecturing on this exact chapter, 
Kant too,  though more implicitly than explicitly,  wanted to trace the genesis of  the 
understanding.30 Fichte (and Deleuze also mentions Maïmon), wanted to complete the 
Kantian project by simultaneously tracing the genesis of  matter. The "true problem of 
Kantianism",   Deleuze   says,   is   "in   what   way   are   receptivity   and   spontaneity   in 
harmony?"31  Hence   we   see   clearly   that   Bergson   inscribes   himself,   wittingly   or 
30 Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture Course on Chapter Three of Bergson's Creative Evolution.,” SubStance 
Issue 114: Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution, vol. 36, no. 3 &4, 2007, 77-8.
31 Loc. cit. Compare also with what Bourgeois writes a few years later on Fichte: The difficulty for a 
philosophy that does not want to be transcendent and incomplete lies in accounting for the 








1898 Bergson had been commissioned (we know little  as   to  who  initiated  this)   to 
lecture on Fichte's  The Vocation of Man.32 For this course Bergson greatly exceeds the 











32 See FCI.  In a letter to X.  Léon from 5/12/1914 Bergson writes of  notes he has made when 
preparing for this course. Would these notes have been destroyed or could they be found in the 
Bergson  Archives?  See  Henri  Bergson,  Correspondances (Paris:  Presses  Universitaires  de 
France, 2002).
Fichte appears a number of times in other lecture transcripts of courses given prior to this one.  
Fichte  does  not  appear  in  any  of  the  lecture-transcripts  available  to  us  of  courses  given 
subsequently. For a discussion of all references to Fichte in lectures, letters and publications see 
Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, “Bergson et Nabert, lecteurs de Fichte,”  Fichte-Studien Bd. 13, no. 




his   theoretical  writings   had   received   very   little   independent   study.   In   1898,   then, 
Bergson had little to fall back on.33 The first mayor French work to appear on Fichte's 









33 The political ideas of Fichte were already made known to the French public during the French 
Revolution via a publication in the Moniteur Universel of 1795. The only translations available to 
Bergson were of Die Bestimmung des Menschen (partial translation in 1801 and in full in 1833 
by Barchou de Penhoën; Bergson refers to this translation) and of Die Reden and die Deutschen 
Nation in  1813.  First  lectures  on  Fichte  by  Victor  Cousin,  a  prominent  Hegelian,  in  1815. 
Ravaisson,  who was an important influence on Bergson,  had studied under Cousin and also 
under Schelling.  First extensive presentation of Fichte's philosophy by Joseph Willm in 1847 
(Histoire  de la  philosophie  allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel.  T.  II,  Règne de l'idéalisme 
critique et  transcendantal.  Philosophie de Fichte,  de Jacobi).  Next publication on Fichte was 
subsequent to the lectures, in 1902 by Xavier Léon. At the start of the 20th Century Fichte was 
generally incorporated in French spiritualism and personalism, as a reaction to positivism. See 
H.J. Sandkühler (herst.), Handbuch Deutscher Idealismus (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2005), 365-7.
In  his  lecture  course  Bergson  refers  to  I.H.  Fichte's  J.  G.  Fichte’s  Leben  und  literarischer 
Briefwechsel (1862);  to Kuno Fischer,  probably his Geschichte der neurn Philosophie  and to 
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's La philosophie de Jacobi (1894), a reference that also appears in the original 
1903 text of An Introduction to Metaphysics.
34 This was La philosophie de Fichte, ses rapports avec la conscience contemporaine (Paris: Alcan, 
1902)
35 Bergson  Correspondances, letter  dated  April  15th,  1902,  67-8.  Fichte  is  mentioned  in  the 




















philosopher of   the unconscious (Matter and Memory,  1896) certainly had his 
reasons to encounter Fichte, author of The Facts of Consciousness and co­inventor 
36 According to J.-C. Goddard. See his “Bergson, Fichte und der Bergsonismus,” Conference paper: 
"Bergson  und Deutschland.  Das  Problem der  Lebensphilosophie",  2007a  (conference  paper), 
forthcoming in Fichte studien. 
37 Correspondances, letter dated December 5th, 1914, 603-4.
38 See e.g., Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the Princes of Europe, who have Hitherto  
Suppressed it (1793)







relation   of   duration   to   embodiment;   the   question   of   individuation   that   we   have 
discussed above. The second problem concerns how we are to know of "duration"? It is 
precisely   a   question   of  method  in   philosophy.   This   question   he   develops   in  An 











have   been   really   influenced   by   him.  In   this   thesis  we  will   focus   on   the  internal 
40 Note also that "the absolute" had been completely absent from his two previous works.
41 Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, “Bergson et Fichte,” in  Fichte et la France (1997a), 201-220; and 
“Bergson et Nabert, lecteurs de Fichte,” (1997b), this article as concerns Bergson, is almost the 
same  as  the  preceding  article.  Jean-Christophe  Goddard,  “Introduction  à  La  Destination  de 
l'homme,” in  La Destination de l'homme (GF-Flammarion, 1995),  7-42; “Bergson: une lecture 
néo-platonicienne de Fichte,”  Les Études Philosophiques, no. Bergson et l'idéalisme allemand 
(2001): 465-77 and Goddard 2007a.
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development in Bergson's   thought.  It   is   this  development that  led him to write  the 
works   that  he  did.  The   juxtaposition  of  Bergson   and  Fichte  will  not   be  part  of   a 
historical­philosophical exegesis but will take place on the level of their philosophical 









As we have  already noted,  both Fichte  and Bergson were  not   satisfied  with  Kant's  
deduction. What needed to be shown much more clearly was how and why the matter 
and form of experience hold together. A transcendental deduction alone was deemed 
insufficient.   Kant   had   done  well   to,   as   it   were,   "back­track"   to   the   conditions   of  
experience, but this needed to be complemented with a genetic derivation of experience 








and   Memory.   Here   he   demonstrated   how   the   forms   of   experience   are   so   many 















intuition  is   the creation of   this   form.  Then  instead of   the disproportion  that 
obliges us to consider form and matter as given, and thus the relativity of all  













Bergson notes  astutely   further  on  in   the   lecture series,  we need  to  posit  an  I   that 




















non­I,  which   represents   the  arithmetical  difference  between  individual   I  and 
pure I (op. cit., 178).
This  passage   is  extraordinary  and could  be  discussed at   length.  Note,   for   instance, 
Bergson's use of "interval", a term not found in the Foundations but so very important to 








































42 On Bergson and Alexandrinism see the already mentioned article by Goddard 2001 and Sylvain 
Roux,  “L'ambiguïté  néoplatonicienne:  Bergson  et  la  philosophie  grecque  dans  L'Évolution 
créatrice,” conference paper available on
 www.europhilosophie.eu/recherche/IMG/pdf/Sylvain_Roux.pdf. 
43 See Maritain, 2007.
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Part I: Fichte
I. TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM
The three chapters that make up the first part of this thesis discuss Fichte’s theoretical  
work  from  the  Jena period,  with  a   special   focuss  on  the  Foundations  of   the  Entire  
Wissenschaftslehre. In Chapter I we first discuss how certain criticisms made in the very 
first   reception   of   Kant’s   philosophy   form   the   point   of   departure   for   Fichte’s   own 
philosophy.  Towards   the   end  of   the   chapter   these   criticisms   and  Fichte’s   tentative 
remarks on a possible combined solution to these concerns will be formalised in the 
form of a set of demands or a programme for the desired philosophy of freedom.
Chapter   II  will   discuss   the  Foundations  in   detailed  manner,   in   light   of   the 
programme as formulated in Chapter I. We thus gain an intimate understanding of both 
Fichte’s   argument   and  also   of   the  particular   nature  of   this   argument.  Contrary   to 
popular belief this is shown not to consist of a linear deduction, but rather a gradually 
deepening and widening; not linear but a spiral­shaped argument. In Chapter III we 




In  the  decade  that   lies  between  the   first  publication of   the Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  in  1781  and  Fichte’s  presentation   in   Jena  of   the  Foundations   of   the  Entire  
Wissenschaftslehre in 1794 there emerged a rapidly growing debate that centred around 
Kant’s philosophy. Although immediately recognised as a water­shed in philosophy, the 
precise   implications  of   this  work  were   certainly   less   easy   to   grasp.  This   is   hardly 
surprising   as   the   technical   language,   the   intricate   argumentation   and   the   subtle 
distinctions can be as  perplexing  today as   they were  then.   In  the  first  part  of   this 
chapter   we   will   discuss   three   early   commentators,   who   each   had   an   important 
influence in that earliest reception of the Kantian philosophy. Although one might be 
tempted to dismiss some of their objections as unfounded, or as “clearly” going against 
the  letter of  Kant,  we should not forget that even with over  two hundred years of  
intense Kant­studies by practically all of the great philosophers, we continue to dispute 
“what Kant had really said”. Knowledge of the criticisms and interpretations of Kant by 
Jacobi,   Reinhold   and   Schulze,  whether   they   be   correct   or   incorrect   allows   us   to 
understand   the  Kantian  philosophy  Fichte  was   responding   to.  As   our   reading  will  
progress we will come to see that Fichte, rather than attempting to “overbid” Kant, in 
fact aimed to correct these criticisms.1 We will see that, although engaged in an attempt 
to   rewrite   and   clarify   Kant’s   original   position,   Fichte   remained   faithful   to   the 
transcendental project.2
1 See also  Manfred Frank, “Fragmente einer Geschichte der Selbstbewusstseinsheorie von Kant 
bis  Sartre,”  in  Idem Selbsbewusstseinstheorien  von  Fichte  bis  Sartre (Frankfurt  am  Mein: 
Suhrkamp, 1991), 449.
2 See also Alexander Schnell, “L'idée fondamentale du transcendentalisme fichtéen,” Archives de 
















Kant’s   major   claims.  First   of   all,   it   conflicts   with   Kant’s  “quasi­phenomenalistic 
idealism”. If things produce appearances in us, and these are “merely subjective beings, 
with no existence outside of  us”,   then  they cannot at   the same time be the mind­
independent entities that Kant needed to appease the realists.3  If they are not mind­




3 Jacobi as quoted in Wayne Martin, “From Kant to Fichte,” in  Cambridge Companion to Fichte 












If   we   compare   the   first   and   second   versions   of   the   phenomenal­noumenal 












4 See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, “David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. 



















entity.   Indeed,   another   important   difference   between   the  A   and  B   editions   is   the 
"Refutation   of   Idealism".   Here   Kant   tried   to   strengthen   his   argument   that   inner 
experience   can  only   be  possible  under   the   condition  of  outer  experience   (B  275), 
without, however, completely succeeding in this demonstration.
The question of the thing in itself has, as Martin rightly points out, "often proved 
to  be a  misleading point  of  reference  from which to  construct  an  interpretation of 
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Kant  himself  as  a  faithful  representative of  Kant’s  philosophical  position.  Reinhold’s 
own   philosophy   only   enjoyed   a   relatively   limited   success   but   the   programmatic 
conditions   he   formulated  vis  à   vis  transcendental   philosophy   turned   out   to   be   of 




and   can   be   equated   with   metaphysics.   The   second   concerns   the   structure   of 
consciousness   itself   and   the  possibility   of   representation.  Kant   had   established   the 




5 Martin, forthcoming, 5.
6 See  Dieter Henrich,  Between Kant and Hegel: lectures on German Idealism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 140.
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felt,   of   his   preoccupation   with   the   objects   of   consciousness   (representations   or 
knowledge) rather than with consciousness itself. That is, although Kant had shown 
what we may know, he had failed to adequately ground the domain of knowledge. 








assuming   it   as   principle.8  This,   Reinhold   said,   could   be   nothing   but   the  fact   of  
consciousness.   Consciousness  must   necessarily   be   presupposed   and   can   never   be 
abstracted from the system without leading to incoherence. This fact of consciousness 





7 Fichte will add an entire footnote on "hidden principle" to his 'Second Introduction'. He cites 
Kant from KrV A 82 / B 108. See ZE 479n / 63n. Frederick Neuhouser refers to the Critique of 
Practical  Reason  as  the  source  for  this  idea.  See  Frederick  Neuhouser,  Fichte's  Theory  of 
Subjectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 22.
8 See  Ernst-Otto Onnasch, “De fundering van de filosofie: de Wetenschapsleer van 1794/5,” in 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Een inleiding in zijn denken, ed. Paul Cruysberghs and Peter Jonkers 
(Kampen: Kok Agora, 1997), 75. Onnasch calls this a "final grounding" or Letzbegründung.
9 Karl Leonhard Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge (excerpt),” in  Between 
Kant and Hegel, ed. George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 70. See 

































principle,   yet   also   refered   to   it.   And   the   subject   and   object   themselves  must   be 













10 See also Onnasch 1997, 76-7.
11 See Henrich, 2003, p. 140 and Lectures IX and X generally. On Reinhold see also George di  
Giovanni, "The Facts of Consciousness", in Between Kant and Hegel, ed. George di Giovanni and 
H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); Martin, "From Kant to Fichte"; §2; Neuhouser 1990, 
Chapter I.
12 See also Frank 1991, 433.
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Section 3  below.   Intellectual   intuition ultimately  concerns   the  status  and nature  of 
philosophical   knowledge   itself.  As  Bernard  Bourgeois  writes,   it   is   by   reinserting   a 
reflection on philosophy into the very concept of philosophy that the relation between 
philosophy and her object, between philosophy and  life  is reinstated.13  As Bourgeois 
quotes Fichte from the First Introduction:
The kind of philosophy one chooses thus depends upon the kind of person one 
is.   [And we continue  the  quote]  For  a  philosophical   system  is  not  a   lifeless 
household   item one   can   put   aside   or   pick  up   as   one  wishes;   instead,   it   is  
animated by the very soul of the person who adopts it (EE 434 / 20).
1.3 The skeptical challenge: Schulze's Aenesidemus
After   the unexpected success  of  his  An Attempt at  a  Critique  of  All  Revelation14  the 
erstwhile   completely   unknown  Fichte   had   been   asked   in   1793   by   the   prestigious 
Allgemeine Literatur­Zeitung to review an important skeptical attack on Reinholdian and 





13 Bourgeois, 1995, 1-2.
14 Fichte had walked to Köningsbergen to meet Kant in the hope that he would be able to procure a  
post for him. In order to impress him he wrote, in the space of a number of weeks, this Critique. 
For some reason it was published without the name of the author. The style and content were so  
close to Kant's that it was immediately heralded as the long-awaited word of Kant on the matter  





representation   and   the   representations   themselves,   an   issue   that   Jacobi   had   also 
already raised.15  Reinhold had made the faculty of representation the first principle. 
This faculty, Schulze claimed, was understood by Reinhold as the cause and ground of 
actual   representations.   Yet   this   faculty   may   only   be   inferred   from   actual 














15 For a detailed analysis of Schulze’s argument and of Fichte’s response see di Giovanni, 2000, 20-
32, see also Henrich 2003, Lecture X, XI. 
16 Gottlob Ernst Schulze, “Aenesidemus Or Concerning the Foundations of The Philosophy of The 
Elements Issued by Prof. Reinhold in Jena Together with a Defence of Skepticism Against the 
Pretensions of The Critique of Reason. (excerpt),” in  Between Kant and Hegel, ed. George di 
Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 107.
17 Op. cit., 108.








How  do   subject   and   object   hold   together?  How   do  we   prove   the   transcendental 
conditions?   How   is   transcendental   philosophy   itself   grounded?   And   what   is   a 





























relations   of   distinguishing   and   referring   between   the   subject,   the   object   and   the 
representation   followed  out   of   the   analysis   of   the   fact   of   consciousness.21  Schulze 
denied this claim and felt it to be merely synthetic. Fichte agrees with Schulze but for a 
“deeper ground” not seen by either Reinhold or Schulze (RA 6­7 / 140).  He writes:
20 Recension des Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der vom Herrn Prof. Reinhold in Jena  
gelieferten Elementarphilosophie in Sämmtliche Werke I, translation in George di Giovanni and 
Henry Stilton Harris, Between Kant and Hegel (New York: SUNY). Abbr. to RA.





At   the   ground   of   consciousness   we   find   an   act,   the   performance   (Handlung)   of 











Continuing  his  discussion of   the  Aenesidemus,  Fichte  notes   that  according   to 
Schulze, Reinhold’s principle is an abstract proposition and not, as Reinhold himself 
held, based on some alledged fact. If it is not a real and indubitable fact then it cannot 
ground a  real  philosophy.23  Again,  Fichte's   response  is  nuanced.  He writes   that   the 
principle of consciousness cannot be empirical alone; indeed, we necessarily abstract 
22 Henrich considers this to be one of the key discoveries of German Idealism, see Henrich 2003, 
166
23 Fichte: "we must have a real principle, and not a merely formal one" RA 8 / 141. As will become 
clear  as  this  chapter  unfolds,  Fichte  felt  that  until  materiality  had  been  deduced  from 























related   activities   being   executed.   As   Lessing   writes:   "a   series   of   movements 
24 For the following see the respective lemmas in  Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und 
Wilhelm Grimm. 16 Bde. [in 32 Teilbänden]. Leipzig: S. Hirzel 1854-1960. See also the lemma 
"Tathandlung" in excellent Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (im 13 Bände), eds. Gründer 
Ritter, et. al. (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1971-2007).
25 See "Tathandlung" in Ritter et al. 1971-2007.
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(bewegungen)  that  aim  for  a   final  purpose   (endzweck)   is   called  a  handlung."26  The 
English   “to   handle   something”   is   quite   close,   as   equally   the   of   Latin   root 
“manipulation”, both retaining the connotation of the operations of the hand, although 
both share a strong sense of something external that is being handled which is not quite 










representative,   two   affirmative   responses   by   the   couple   being  wed,   and   then   the 






26 As quoted in Grimm and Grimm 1854-1960, in the lemma ‘Handlung’.
27 DiGiovanni  translates  the  compound  as  “fact  as  performance”,  Heath  and  Lachs  in  their 
translation of the  Grundlage opted for “Act”; Daniel  Breazeale follows Heath and Lachs,  see 
Breazeale 1994, editors footnote 48n.
28 J.L. Austin,  How to do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard  
University in 1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 6.
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comes into being with the utterance of p. The realization of the sentence, i.e., its actual 
performance,   is   what   makes   the   sentence   true.   Its   "truth­condition"   is   thus   self­









activity   itself.   Clearly   his   use   of   the   term  Tathandlung  exceeds   a  mere   linguistic 









29 See Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel,  Critique de la représentation. Étude sur Fichte (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 
77. She also refers to Tathandlung as “dire-faire”refering to an unspecified Fichte scholar (ibid.).
30 The sentence “grass is green” is true if and only if there is a perception of something that both 
refers  to  “grass”  and  to  “green”.  The  truth  of  this  sentence  can  be  evaluated  without  any 
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The   transcendental   act   of   synthesis   understood   as  Handlung  (operation   / 




place)  neither   side can be merely  analytically  deduced  from the  other.  Secondly,  a 
Tathandlung  is   never  abstract  because   it   cannot  be  evaluated  outside  of   its   actual 







reference to this sentence itself. The sentence “I now declare you man and wife”, however, can 




According   to   a   reading   that   has   been   very   prominent,   when   Fichte   writes   that 
consciousness is not a thing but an activity that exists for and through itself, he is said  
to have effectively cut a Gordian knot in philosophy.  The problem that is addressed is 
said   to   concern   the   nature   of   self­consciousness.   Dieter   Henrich  was   the   first   to 
formulate the problem in this way in a very influential article first published in 1966 
called “Fichte’s Original  Insight”.  Fichte’s  insight  is situated within a debate of self­
consciousness in light of what Henrich has called the traditional understanding in terms 
of “the reflection model of consciousness.”31 This model consists of the following set of 




the  object.  Object­consciousness   thus   requires   self­consciousness,   for  otherwise  one 
could be aware of an object without being aware that one is aware, which would be 





31 See Dieter Henrich, "Fichte's Original Insight", Contemporary German Philosophy 1 (1982, first 
published  in  1966),  19,  21.  See  also  Manfred  Frank,  “'Intellektuale  Anschauung.'  Drei 
Stellungnahmen  zu  eimen  Deutungsversuch  von  Selbstbewußtsein:  Kant,  Fichte, 
Hölderlin/Novalis,”  in  Die  Aktualität  der  Frühromantik (Paderborn:  Schöningh,  1987),  113; 
Frank 1991, 434. Thomas-Fogiel makes the same point on p. 74 to Thomas-Fogiel 2000 and must 






















32 Op. cit., 20.
33 See Henrich, 2003, 232. See also Sect. 3.2 below.
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created a dilemma that Kant was able to see but was unable to evade.34 On the one 
hand Kant  clearly   stated   that  all  knowledge was  representational,  with   the   further 
specification   that   representations   were   composed   of   sensible   intuitions   and   the 
concepts  of   the understanding.  Only   if   intuitions could be given to   the senses and 
brought under concepts could we speak of a possible object of experience. Insofar as 




But  Kant  also  appealed   to   the  “I   think”.  Only  under   the   assumption  of   the 





me   that  would   not   be   thought   at   all”  (loc.   cit.).   That   is,   for   there   to   be   object­





representation that Kant  claims  is  able   to  accompany all  my other  representations? 
This, in fact, was effectively the point raised by Schulze. If Kant does not want to be 








he   tries   to   explain   the  “I   think”,   something   he   has   just   called  “an   indeterminate 
empirical intuition, i.e., a perception” (KrV B 422, see also A 343 / B 400):














conceived   as   self­identification,   without   falling   into   an   infinite   regress.35  If   self­
35 See Frank 1987, 19981; Henrich 1982, 2003; Pippin 1989 and Paul W. Franks  All or Nothing. 
Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, MA: 
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that   is   properly   transcendental   (in   the   sense   of   not   overstepping   the   bounds   of 





a   determinate   and   a   determined   pole.  What   the   problem  of   self­consciousness   as 




But  we have gotten ahead of  ourselves.  The ambiguity as  to  the nature and 
possibility of any knowledge of the I has historically been understood as a debate on 
Harvard University Press, 2005).
36 It was Manfred Frank who first got me interested in Fichte during a course on Self-awareness 
and Self-knowledge that I was fortunate enough to be able to attend as a student during an 
exchange with the New School University in 1999.
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Kant uses the concept of  intellectual  intuition to bring out the specificity of  human 
understanding.  The  three  questions   that  are   raised   in   the  discussion of   intellectual 
intuition  are:   In  what   sense   is  human  understanding  discrete?   In  what   sense   is   it 
limited?   And  in what sense  is   it  mediated? To bring out   these qualities  Kant  will 
recourse to non­human or hypothetical forms of understanding; forms we might be able 
to conceive but that we cannot comprehend.
37 Some examples of literature to the contrary are 1.) On Kant, Fichte and Novalis: Frank 1987, 96-
126;  2.)  On  Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling:  Moltke  S.  Gram,  "Intellectual  Intuition:  The  Continuity 
Thesis",  Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981); 3.) On Fichte, Schelling and Hegel: Alexis 
Philonenko, "Die Intellektuelle Anschauung bei Fichte", in Études kantiennes (Paris: Vrin, 1981) 
197-212;  4.)  On  Fichte:  Dan  Breazeale  "Fichte's  Nova  Methodo  Phenomenologica:  On  the 
methodological  role  of  'intellectual  intuition'  in  the  later  Jena  Wissenschafslehre",  Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie  52,  no.  4 (1998) 587-618;   Breazeale lists  further literature in 
























38 Gram 1981, 289.










forms  mechanically,   our  unity  will   only   be   an   aggregate.41  If  we   approach  her   as 
producing forms artistically or technically, our unity will be a system. Now either all  
generation of   forms  is  mechanical,  or  some generation  is  not.  The problem with a 






this   point   Kant   then   opposes   our   limited   human   understanding   to   a   form   of 
understanding he names intuitiv.42 
40 Gram 1981, 292-3
41 First Introduction in found in Kant's gesammelten Schriften XX, p. 217. Translation KU, 20.
42 What is interesting to note is that on three occasions in this paragraph Kant uses the adjective 
intuitiv(en) rather than his preferred term  Anschauung. Unfortunately this is not noted in the 
otherwise  excellent  translation.  I  am  not  an  expert  of  the  German  language  and  so  I  am 
receptive to suggestions from experts in the field, but such a use seems to be rather significant. 
Normally  intellectual  intuition  (Anschauung)  is  opposed  to  sensible  intuition.  Here  intuitive 
(intuitiven) understanding is opposed to discursive understanding.
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Our limited, human understanding contains a discursive element which concerns 
the   correct   application   of  a   priori  concepts   and   an   empirical   element,   that   is,   it 







contingent  precisely because  it  starts   from the whole.  Our understanding,  however, 
must always proceed from parts to whole. We must think the whole of knowledge but 
such   a  whole   is   only   a   regulative   Idea   for   the  understanding.  The   second  use   of 




The   third   type   of   problematic   intellect   that   Gram   distinguishes   is   a   creative,   or 
archetypal  intellect  (intellectus archetypus).43  Such an intellect would create  its  own 
object. What it creates would be neither a thing in itself nor an appearance. We may 
understand  God’s   intuition   to   be   something  of   this   kind.  This  ürbildliches  intellect 
removes the distinction between the actuality and possibility of things (see KU  §§ 76­










actuality   and  possibility.   To   explain   this  Kant  uses   different   notions   of   intellectual 













44 Gram 1981, 292.
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the University of Jena in the years 1796 to 1799, after his lectures on the Foundations 








What you  notice when  you  pay  close attention to how you do this is a transition in 
thought. Thought, fixed on one point, detaches itself and focuses on another point. This 
transition from one point to another shows us something important about thought, it  
shows us that thought is an activity; it is the  activity of determining  (Bestimmen)  its 














appeal   to   “think   the   I”   is   a   first   step   in   becoming   aware   of   the   active  nature   of 






is  reason to say, as the Henrich school has,   that Fichte posits  a form of   immediate  
consciousness   in  an attempt   to  evade  the   infinite   regress   that  a   representationalist 
model of consciousness would create, this does not as such entail that Fichte assumes 
the   solution   to   be   a   form   of   immediate   self­consciousness   that   consists   of   a   self 
identification, neither does it entail that the exact argument as we find it (his own self­
understanding   aside)   is   one   that   is   most   favourably   read   as   such   a   form   of 
consciousness Rather, and as should become more clear when we turn to a detailed 
analysis   of   the  Foundations  in   the   next   chapter,   although   Fichte   does   write   that 
immediate self­consciousness must accompany all consciousness, this immediate  self­
consciousness   can   only   posited   as  active  when   a   “state   of   repose”   is   posited   in 
opposition to  it  (WLnm 66,  summary of  §1).  Hence “self”­consciousness  contains a 











































finally   (3.)   an   intuition   that  would   create   its  own object.  As  we  now see  Fichte’s 
intellectual intuition concerns none of these. 
Concerning the first form Fichte writes in the  Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo 


























47 Johann Gottlieb Fichte,  Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo.  Kollegnachtschrift K. Chr. Krausse. 
edited by Erich Fuchs (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982, zweite verbesserte Auflage, 1994); translation in 
Foundations  of  Transcendental  Philosophy  (Wissenschaftslehre)  nova  methodo  (1796/99),  








Kant   writes   that   all   representations  must   be   accompanied   by   the  “I   think”.   This 
representation  “I think”  is an act of spontaneity. This act, as Kant himself writes,  is 
given   in   pure   apperception   and   not   in   empirical   apperception,   hence   Kant,   too, 
appealed to intellectual intuition (FCI, 171).










48 One  commentator,  and  certainly  not  the  only  one,  to  accuse  Fichte  of  having  removed  all 
reference to a thing in itself is Karl Ameriks in his Kant and the Fate of Autonomy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). He accuses Fichte of what he calls a “short argument to 
idealism”, in contrast with Kant’s own long argument. This short argument would conclude that 
all knowledge is restricted to the phenomenal (163, 163). He argues this point very sloppily (at 
least as concerns Fichte) to conclude that Fichte  is reluctant “to accept a ‘given’” (176).  His 
main textual evidence seems to be a loose reference to The Vocation of Man (reference is only 
given to Part III as a whole) where he simply assumes that Fichte is speaking of Kant (173, 
173n). But of course the  Vocation was explicitly intended as a popular work and not a single 
instance of a name is found therein. Indeed, he supports his claim by quoting, not Fichte, but 
Jacobi (173n). Upon further inspection I found in the 101 pages dedicated to Fichte only  two 
references to Fichte’s  Foundations, and both were indirect! (see n54 to 229 and n37 to 249). 
Equally he decides to “bracket” the  Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo  (n14 to 202). When the 

























































Intellectual   intuition for Fichte  is   first  and foremost attentiveness   to how we 
think. As thought reverting back to itself it is not concerned with anything sensible or 
empirical, although as we have seen it requires empirical matter for it to take place at  
all.  This   awareness     is   immediate   intellectual   consciousness.  The   representation   “I 
think”   should   be   able   to   accompany   all   representational   activity,   i.e.,   explicit   self­
perception  must   always  be  possible,  but   it  does  not  ground   this   spontaneous   self­
perception. That it  can  accompany my representations does not mean it always does. 
Kant wrote that the transcendental unity of consciousness is spontaneous or self­active. 










50 See J.G. Fichte RA 7 / 140. An insight, in fact, already found clearly expressed by Kant when he 
writes that the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest principle (KrV B 136) or that ‘the 




the  subject  of   thought  –  a   thinking   subject.  We  ask:  Who or  what   thing   is   it   that 









to   determine   it   anew.   Thought   is   agility   or   a   process   that   results   in   object­







51 See also the discussion at Ch. II, Sect. 2.4.
52 Erste  Kapitel  in  Sämmtliche  Werke  I,  translation  "Chapter  One"  in  Introductions  to  the 
Wissenschaftslehre. Abbr. to EK
53 For  Kant  of  course  the  concept  combines  with  intuitions  to  form  a  representation.  Kant's 
distinction between intuition and concept as one of content and form is reformulated by Fichte, 
not  as  content  external  to  form but  as  a  determined-pole  and  a  determining-pole.  What  is 














our   inner  acting  and   this   is   called   intellectual   intuition.  The   intuition  of  our  own 




concepts   is  one of  Fichte's  key  insights  and  it   is   this   that  helps  us  understand  the 
difference between the absolute I and the limited I as found in the Foundations.55
54 “Die  in  sich  zurückgehende  Thätigkeit  als  feststehend  und  beharrlich  aufgefasst,  wodurch  
sonach beides, Ich, als Thatiges, und Ich, als Objekt meiner Thätigkeit, zusammenfallen, ist der  
Begriff des Ich.”
55 We will return to this in Ch. III, Sect. 2.4.
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We have seen that Kant had not one but three different problems in mind when 








intuitions   with   the   concepts   of   the   understanding   is   the   spontaneous   work   of 
consciousness.   The   awareness   of   this   spontaneous   activity   was   not   properly 
distinguished by Kant   from  the  awareness  of  objects.  But  Fichte   showed that   such 
awareness is possible because it concerns an attentiveness to the proper functioning of 
consciousness itself. Such attentiveness he named intellectual intuition. The spontaneity 




Fichte's  use  of   intellectual   intuition.  On  the  one hand he  appeals   to  an occasional 
awareness that appears in attentiveness to thought as an ongoing process, on the other 
hand he appeals to intellectual intuition as the necessary third component of complete 









We have seen that  there were three problems in the immediate reception of  Kant ’s 
philosophy. These concern the status of the thing in itself, the necessity of a proof for 
transcendental philosophy and a demand for a deduction from first principles. These 










56 See the long footnote to ZE 479n / 63n: "When one is unable to make satisfactory progress in 







































demonstrate  more clearly  how and why  the  transcendental  and  the  empirical  hold 
together.




we   ever   be   sure   of   it?   This   ground,   Reinhold   felt,   had   to   lie   the   principle   of 
representation. It is in representation that the subject and the object are related and 
57 J.H.  Jacobi  "Letter  to  Fichte" in  E.  Behler  ed.,  Philosophy  of  German  Idealism (New York: 
Continuum, 1987), Translated by D.I. Behler, 130. Of course Jacobi's religiously inspired desire 
for truth is very different from Schulze's skepticism, still the ground for both concerns lay in the 















conditioned entertain an  intrinsic  relation.  Second,  as   the analysis  of   the notion of 













































the   phenomena   as   claimed   by   determinism.   Freedom   would   then   no   longer   be 
equivalent but different, but it would include the other perspective. As Bergson notes in 




58 Hence I would agree with Daniel Breazeale that the circularity of the argument, rather than 
denying foundationalism, constitutes a form of foundationalism. See his very instructive article 
“Circles  and  Grounds  in  the  Jena  Wissenschaftslehre,”  in  Fichte:  Historical  Contexts  /  
Contemporary  Controversies (New  Jersey:  Humanities  Press,  1994),  43-70.  For  an  anti-
foundationalist account see  Tom Rockmore, “Antifoundationalism, Circularity, and the Spirit of 
Fichte,” in the same collection, 96-112. Also of interest is  Alain Perrinjacquet, “Some Remarks 
Concerning the Circularity  of  Philosophy and the Evidence of  Its  First  Principle  in the Jena 








(1.)  If   determinism,   in   starting   with   the   interaction   of   things   as   found   in  
experience, is unable to account for the unity of experience and for a real and active  
principle of freedom, can we then, starting exactly with such unity and with a real  






ultimately   the   thing   in   itself,   or  at   least   in  part   it   finds   its  ground  in   the   I  or   in  
consciousness. These two systems he names dogmatism and idealism respectively (EE 
426 / 11). The one system cannot refute the other because they do not agree on first  














experience can never  be self­grounding.  Hence the  idealist  denies   the very basis  of 
dogmatism and the  dogmatist  denies   the  basis  of   idealism.  Equally  any attempt  to 
combine the two positions is bound to fail. Fichte:
Anyone who wishes to challenge this claim must establish the possibility of such 








illusion   arising   from   the   interaction   of   things.   I   have   an   immediate   awareness   of 
freedom and this is what initially leads me to posit it as a first principle.59 This is to 
59 Strictly  speaking  this  intuition  of  freedom is  not  the  same  as  the  intuition  of  spontaneous 




on the experience of   freedom. Because such an experience can never  be forced on 
someone we will have to accept that not everyone will be convinced of the superiority 
of this philosophy. 











freedom,   our   philosophy  of   freedom would  be   able   to   explain   both   freedom  and 
necessity. 
4.4 Fichte contra Schelling
As we read  in the quote above Fichte  in  fact  denies  the possibility  of  a continuous 
transition from freedom to necessity.  Yet I  propose to read this passage against  the 
explicit intentions of the author. The most important reason to do so is that it will allow 





in   direct   discussion  with   Schelling.60  At   this   point   Fichte   and   Schelling  were   still 
entertaining amiable relations. Schelling understood himself as a mere expositor of the 
Fichtean  doctrine,   and   to   a   large  extent  Fichte   agreed  on   this.  Schelling  had   just 
published his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795/96) in which he 
had  defended   the   irreconcilable   nature   of   dogmatism  and   criticism   (viz  idealism). 





his   friend  Hegel   that   since   for  God  no  object   existed  whatsoever   (God  being   the 
absolute totality), we needed to strive to “destroy” our personality to thus pass unto the 





60 See Lauth 1975, 37-51.
61 See also Breazeale's “Editor's Introduction” to  Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, xxiii ff. 
Compare also with Kant KrV A 92 /  B 124-5 :  "There are only  two possible cases  in which 
synthetic representation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and,  
as it were, meet each other. Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the  
representation alone makes the object possible."
62 Schelling as quoted in Lauth 1975, 18.
63 Lauth op. cit. 37.


















synthesis,   then this  by itself  entails  a relation to that  “for which  it  exists”.  This,  he 
claims, is not the case when we posit a self­existing thing. That is because the idealist 
always posits a double series, whereas the dogmatist can only posit a single series. The 
idealist   posits   both   a  “series   of   being”  (“existence   as   intellect”)   and   a  “series   of 
65 Op. cit., 43.
66 See also Lauth op. cit., 45-6.
67 Durch ihr Gesetztseyn, als Intelligenz, ist das, für welches sie sey, schon mit gesetzt.
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observing”  (“what  is posited along with  it”),  or again, a  “real  series”  (existence for 




For   Fichte   consciousness,   as  spontaneous  activity,   exists   immediately,   or  “for 
itself”. This immediate existence includes that which exists for consciousness (the “ideal 
series”).  What  does   consciousness  mean  here?  Consciousness   is   the   capacity   for   a 
transcendental   synthesis  of   intuitions and concepts.  This  synthesis  of   intuitions and 
concepts, which results in an object of experience, therefore exists for consciousness. 
Without   this   synthesis   of   intuitions   and   concepts   there  would  not   be   anything   to 
combine, hence no transcendental I. Therefore, once consciousness as transcendental 
synthesis is posited, that for which it exists (i.e., intuitions combined with concepts) is 
posited along with  it.  The  idealist   therefore  can  show the  transition  from being  to 
representation,   whereas   the   dogmatist   only   has   being   and   cannot   show   how 
representation appears (op. cit., 436­437 / 22­23). Idealism is thus a superior starting 
point.























on   the   other   hand.   Transcendental   activity   does   not   only   result   in   an   object   of 























Because   it   cannot   be   reduced   to   a  more   fundamental   principle   and   because   this 
principle is said to be self­active, Fichte calls this the  “first, absolutely unconditional 
principle”  (GWL 91 / 93). This is also the principle of  “self­positing”  and Fichte first 
calls it an absolute subject (op. cit., 97 / 98) and then absolute I (op. cit.,  109 /109). 
The  use   of   the   term  “I”  or  “subject”  was   to   prove   somewhat   ill­fated,   leading   to 
68 System der Sittenlehre in Sämmtliche Werke IV; translation in idem., The system of ethics, trans. 
Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) Abbr. to SS. 
69 Fichte opposes an unendliches und unbeschränktes Ich to an enliches und beschränktes Ich in 








clear   is  how when  taking  “determination”  as  a  “spontaneous activity”   this  by  itself 
entails   a   determinant   pole   and   a   determinate   pole.   When   he   will   write   that 
“consciousness” splits into an I and a  not­I, he is not thinking of an opposition of an  
internal and subjective I versus an external and objective not­I, nor does this concern 








of  Ich  over  Selbst  in a footnote to “Chapter One”. The concept of a “self”, he writes, 
signifies “a relationship to something that has already been posited. (…) Hence the word 
“self”  presupposes  the concept  of  the I” (EK 530 / 155, emp. added). The I  refers 
explicitly to Kant’s transcendental unity of the apperception and does not contain any 
70 DiGiovanni in his translation of  RA translates “Ich” with “ego” and Heath and Lachs in their 




When   Fichte  will   try   to   deduce   the   role   and   place   of   the   thing   from   the 
conditions of freedom itself, this  “thing”  becomes the empirical field of a subject of 
experience in relation to, and separation from, an object of experience. And this indeed 
























1 See Breazeale "Editor's Introduction", WLnm, 3.
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sense   of   theory  meaning   contemplation   (FCI,   158).  Wissenschaft  referred   to   that 











it   down  as   it   came   to  him.  Clearly   then   these   are  not   the   best   circumstances   to 
formulate  what   is   ultimately   a   very   original   piece   of  work.  These   conditions  may 
explain the often harsh judgments made of it.  Even the English translators seem to 
display no pity for its author. They feel the book is riddled with “[b]ad punctuation, 





2 This is also the opinion of Bergson, see FCI, 158, and Breazeale, see e.g. the title he gives to the  
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo: Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy.
3 The  Zurich  lectures  aside  Fichte  also  published  Concerning  the  Concept  of  the 
Wissenschaftslehre or of So-called Philosophy just prior to arriving in Jena. This short text is 
rather  about the WL, as Breazeale points out, than being a presentation of it, see  Breazeale, 
"Editor's Introduction", WLnm, 4.
4 "Translators' Preface" to The Science of Knowledge, vii-viii.
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Fichte's own rather impatient nature; more inclined to rewrite the Wissenschaftslehre in 
its   entirety   than   improve   upon   an   existing   version.5  However,   the  Concept   of   the 
Wissenschaftslehre and the Attempt at a New Presentation aside, both of which are either 
about the WL or are only a part of it, the  Foundations remains the only version of the 















but   he   has  merely   asserted   that   this   is   so.   Nor   has   he   provided   any   derivation 
5 At least up to 1804 Fichte explicitly entertained the idea to supplant this presentation of his  
work that was also seen by him as inadequate with one that would be able to present it as a  

















"start  with"   the   absolute   I,   or  with   "self­positing"   as   first  principle,   objective   truth 
considered in its most primary aspect as a mere oppositionality of an I and "that which 
is  outside the I",  or  a “limited I”  and a “limited not­I”,  must  be shown to be both 
















not  me.   The   representation   is   not  me,   yet   it   is  mine.  My   representation  may   be 
distinguished from a (philosophically) possible thing in itself.
In our discussion of the Foundations we will see that Fichte must navigate two 
conflicting  demands:  On  the  one  hand   I   and  not­I  must   be  understood   to   appear 
genetically connected or in  “reciprocal determination”: the I is what the not­I is not. 
And I and not­I must be understood as truly different, that is qualitatively different, and 
not merely  quantitatively  different.  In fact, although this will  only become apparent 
after our discussion of the Foundations, a similar problem holds for the first principle of 
the   absolute   I   and   the   connected  limited  I   and   not­I.   These   two   sides  must   be 
understood to be finally only different aspects or points of view (of philosophy / the 































objects   given   to   the   understanding   but   a   certain   logical   structure   still   remains 






This   supplementary   step   is   perhaps   not   crucial   to   his   overall   argument,   but   it   is 
doubtful nonetheless. Fichte construes identity as self­relation. From this relation “A = 
A” he subsequently abstracts the  relata  to retain the pure form of the relation. This 
relation  is  true  by definition  but Fichte then wants to conclude that,   insofar as this 
relation is necessarily true, so must that which first makes it possible also be true. The 
relation cannot exist without the relata, hence the relata must also necessarily exits. He 
7 For  an  exploration  of  the  relation  of  Fichte  to  Descartes  see  Alexis  Philonenko,  “De  la 
présupposition chez Descartes et Fichte” and “Une lecture fichtéenne du cartésianisme n'est-elle 































an   example   of   something   beyond  doubt   to   show   that  what  makes   this   judgment 
possible   is   consciousness   (92 /  94).  Hence   it   is  “I   am”,  understood as   the   fact  of 
















9 “Das Ich  setzt sich selbst, und es  ist,  vermöge dieses bloßen Setzens durch sich selbst; und  
umgekehrt: Das Ich  ist, und es  setzt sein Sein, vermöge seines bloßen Seins. – Es ist zugleich  
das Handelnde, und das Produkt der Handlung; das Tätige, und das, was durch die Tätigkeit  






















confusion between an I  as  subject  and an I  as  object   for  an absolute subject? The 
absolute   subject,   as  we   know,   is   Fichte’s   term   for   the   transcendental   I   or   for   the 
transcendental   synthetic   act   of   unification.   This  “I”  must   be   presupposed   prior   to 
112




with   the  distinction  between   the  noumenal   and   the  phenomenal.   In  our   everyday 
experience  the world appears  as  real  and existing  independently  of  us.  This   is   the 
empirical perspective. But in order to understand the possibility of objectivity we must 
























now be said to  pertain to  phenomena,   to  be an appearance or  Erscheinung  of  such 
noumena. But this is a transcendental distinction and not an empirical one. A world 
outside any relation to us would not make any sense to us. Kant neither affirms the 

































10 Das Ich stellt sich selbst vor, nimmt insofern sich selbst in die Form der Vorstellung  auf, und ist  





The   absolute   I   considered   in   actuality   constitutes   synthetic   unity,  which   for 
Fichte consists of determination. Empirical intuitions are brought under concepts and 
this   is   a   form   of   judgment   or   determination.   Such   determination   results   in   a 
presentation (Vorstellung) but this entails an opposition between presentation and that 
to  which   it   is  presented:    “Das   Ich  stellt  sich  vor,  …in  die   Form der  Vorstellung”. 




immediately forced to discuss a  bloßes  (”pure”  or  “naked”) opposition of subject and 





systematise   transcendental   philosophy   in   order   to   show   that   "self­positing"   or 







are   merely   concerned   with   showing   how   "self­positing",   "counterpositing"   and 





first,   absolutely  unconditioned  principle  of   self­positing.  Working  backwards   to   the 
conditions of the logical statement “A = A” we found that it is the I am on which the “A 


















































Now   that   we   have   spoken   of   opposition   as  bloßer   Handlungart,   that   is, 





11 Immanuel Kant, “Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy,” in 






content,   and   positing   as  determined  activity,   which   always   entails   opposition. 




not   clearly   distinguish   the   two   aspects   of   the   I.   As   positing,   the  “absolute   I”  is 
unconditioned or absolute. Counterpositing, again as positing, is also absolute, hence a 








12 This finds further confirmation in a sentence from §3, the emphasis is Fichte's: "Although in our 
second [principle] the act of counterpositing could not be deduced; were we however to posit it 
unconditionally as to its pure form we could rigorously prove that what was counterposited (das 
Entgegegengesetzte) must equal the Not-I" (105 / 105-6). 
13 "So wie ich irgend etwas vorstellen soll, muß ich es dem Vorstellenden entgegensetzen."
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negation.   That  we   start  with  self­positing  means  we   start  with   an   activity   that   is 






We have seen that consciousness   is  understood by Fichte as  self­positing.   It   is   self­
positing in the sense of being a spontaneous, that is, self­caused act. And it is self­
positing   in   that,   in,   as   it   were,  acting   out  or   actually   performing   the   task   of 
transcendental synthesis there results an opposition of presentation and that to which it 
14 See Ch II. Sect. 2.1.
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is presented, of not­I and I. In  §2 of the  Foundations, though it is more implicit than 




In   order   to   reconstruct   his   argument   we   need   to   distinguish  more   clearly 
between a number of different senses of the I and not­I. These senses are implied by 
Fichte   but   not   always   indicated.   There   is   the   "absolute   I",   which   is   the   act   of 

































...but   all   such   counterpositing   presupposes   the   identity   of   the   I,   in   which 
something is posited and then something set in opposition thereto (loc. cit.).
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But   if   these were to be absolute reality and absolute negation then the one would 
negate the other. Hence through the notion of  divisibility  (Teilbarkeit), which is “the 
capacity [fähigkeit] for quantity in general, [and] not any determinate quantity” (ibid.), 



















it   changes,   it   becomes  a  something.  The  absolute   I,   in  dividing   itself,   "becomes"   a 
limited I and limited not­I. Where the first principle pertains to the spontaneous, or self­
grounding   nature   of   consciousness,   which   is   not   a   something   and,   preceding   all 
determination, has itself no predicates, it is with the third principle that I and not­I first 
16  “Das absolute Ich des ersten Grundsatzes ist nicht etwas (es hat kein Prädikat, und kann keins 
haben,) es ist schlechthin,  was es ist, und dies läßt sich nich weiter erklären. Jetzt vermittelst  
dieses Begriffs ist im Bewußtsein alle Realität; und von dieser kommt dem Nicht-Ich diejenige  
zu, die dem Ich nicht zukommt, und umgekehrt. Beide sind etwas; das Nicht-Ich dasjenige, was  
das Ich nicht ist,  um umgekehrt. Dem absoluten Ich entgegengesetzt, (welchem es aber nur,  
insofern es vorgestellt wird, nicht insofern es an sich ist, entgegengesetzt werden kann, wie sich  
zu  seiner  Zeit  zeigen  wird)  ist  das  Nicht-Ich  schlechtin  Nichts;  dem  einschränkbaren  Ich 
entgegengesetzt ist es eine negative Größe.”
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become   something.  Hence  we  may,  with   Schrader,   call   this   principle   the  material 
principle.17


















17 W. Schrader,  Empirisches und absolutes Ich. Geschichte des Begriffs Leben in de Philosophie  
J.G.Fichtes (Stuttgart,  1972),  p  52.  See also GWL 123 /  120 where Fichte  calls  it  "den des 
Grundes", "the grounding principle".
18 Compare with the discussion of the distinction between the subjective and the objective as found 








and  not­I,   or   of   subject   and  object,   and   for   their   relational   nature   qua   reciprocal  
determination.  Fichte does not   remove all  difference between the determinate pole 
(subject) and the determined pole (object), hence it is not a form of subjective idealism. 
Because  determination  is  now understood as  an activity,  and more  precisely  as  an 
activity that inherently is directional, the   difference between that which determines 
and that which is determined can now be demonstrated. But at the same time this 
difference remains  inherently  relational:  no determination without something being 
determined,  no   subject  without  an  object.  Furthermore,  because   the   subject   is  not 
defined by or limited to the individual and concrete self, it too can be the passive and 








opposition,   and   the   principle   of   divisibility,   which   he   now   calls   the  “grounding 
principle”  (den des  Grundes)  (123 /120).19 The first principle grounds the other two, 
and these in turn reciprocally determine each other in it. We may thus, Fichte writes,  
proceed to  “develop”  (entwickeln) that which belongs to the  Wissenschaftslehre  itself 
(ibid.). Part II and Part III then, in the words of Fichte, are  Wissenschaftslehre proper, 
whereas   Part   I   is   its   foundation.  But  we  have   seen   in   the  discussion  of   the   First  
Principle, all the elements of self­positing, opposition and reciprocal determination are 
present from the outset.





The   transcendental   spontaneity   of   consciousness   posits   (”in   and   through   itself”)   a 
subject and an object of experience that stand in a relation of reciprocal determination. 
19 Why exactly Fichte calls the principles logical I do not claim to know, but that they are not the  
principles of what we nowadays call logic should be clear from the preceding analysis. As we 
have seen “A=A” and “I=I” are merely a form of short-hand intended to bring the listener to the 
proper starting-point of the self-positing I. With the adjective “logical” he probably wanted to 
indicate that there is an argument that shows why the one principle entails the other. 
20 Das Ich  sowohl  als  das  Nicht-Ich  sind,  beide durch  das  Ich,  und im Ich,  als  durcheinander 
gegenseitig beschränkbar, d.i. so, daß die Realität des Einen die Realität des Andern aufhebe,  
und umgekehrt.
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perspective   of   philosophy   (ZE   483n   /   68n).   Other   related   distinctions   are   those 
between the relative and the absolute and the transcendental and the empirical. The 
distinction  between   the  practical  and   the   theoretical  as   introduced here   should  be 
21 E.g., Fichte first speaks in Part I of self-positing, counterpositing and limitation, then in Part II of  
activity and passivity and of a difference between quantity and quality, and in Part II of striving 
and  "shock."  These  conceptual  pairs  and  triads  both  allow  for  different  expositions  of  the 



















limitable   reality,  a   reality  capable  of  quantity,  and  indeed as   limitable  by  the not­I  
(ibid.). This is something that becomes clear in reflection, that is, from a theoretical  
perspective.   But  practically   speaking  reflection   is   only   possible   due   to   the   infinite 
striving of the I. It is the practical that makes possible the theoretical. As he will later  


















not as such) as already derived from absolute activity, i.e.,  as a  limited  activity and 
passivity. It is in this way that we may understand the following:
Passivity is the mere negation of the pure concept of activity just established; and 
more   so   a  quantitative  one,   since   it   [the   pure   concept   of   activity]   is   itself 
quantitative; for mere negation of activity, without regard to its quantity = 0, 
would be rest (135 / 130).22
22 “Leiden ist bloße Negation des soeben aufgestellten reinen Begriffs der Tätigkeit; und zwar die  
quantitative,  da  er  selbst  quantitativ  ist;  denn  die  bloße  Negation  der  Tätigkeit,  von  der  








sense only.  Passivity  would be  rest,  but rest,  as a zero degree of  activity,  cannot be 
affirmed. Since all reality is activity we only have degrees of activity and never its total 
absence. Passivity as absence of activity is only ever a relative absence, that is, relative  
to   the   presence   of   activity.   The   role   of   this   hypothetical   qualitative   negation   is   a 
negative noumenon (a thought entity),   in  the same sense as   the absolute not­I  we 
discussed above (see Sect. 3.4). It helps us understand the argument without actually 
being affirmed. Hence, from absolute activity, or activity as such, to a differentiation of 
activity   in   activity   and  passivity  we  do  not   find   negation   as   some   external   cause 
(absolute not­I or absolute rest). Absolute activity, as activity, is simple, it is  only  or 
“bloße”  activity.   This   activity,   we   could   say,   using   a   more   modern   formulation, 
differentiates itself; it is a self­differentiating activity. It differentiates itself because self­
positing entails positing and counterpositing; it entails a spectrum ranging from activity 


























23 Er geht in seiner Erklärung der Vorstellung weder von einer absoluten Tätigkeit des Ich, noch  
des Nicht-Ich, sondern von einem Bestimmtsein aus, das zugleich ein Bestimmen ist, weil im  





























the  Practical  Part  of   the  Foundations.  This   contradiction,   I   claim,  has   in   fact  been 
present from the outset. Although the Practical Part will shed a new light on it, it will 
not  fundamentally  alter  the argument.   It   is  worthwhile  quoting this  passage  in  full 



























































would we be able to distinguish between fiction and reality.  But the truth  is  that I 
cannot  at   will  bend   reality   to  my   desires,   the  world   is   there   and   it   resists   my 
determinations. Yet in reflection on this, i.e., when we ask after the conditions for the 































Bestimmtsein,  which at   the same time  is  a  Bestimmen.  But  transcendental   idealism, 
under   its   theoretical   aspect   alone,   takes  us  winging   in  a   circle.  We  need   to   posit 
interdependent activity and passivity and  reciprocally determining I and not­I. Yet this 
in   itself   entails   the   assumption   of   independent   activity   by   the   I   (its   absolute 
spontaneity) and independent activity by the not­I (its "shock"). These two sides are in 
conflict. As Fichte himself admits, 
As   to   what   this   determination  may   again   determine,   the   theory   offers   no 
decision  at  all;   and  in  virtue  of   this   incompleteness,  we are   thus  driven  on 
beyond theory into a practical part of the Wissenschaftslehre (178 / 164). 
From a theorectical perspective the question as to the  ground  of the spontaneity of 











III. AN EXERCISE IN AMBIGUITY
1. A programme for (transcendental) philosophy
Fichte's  project   responded   to  a  number  of   challenges   raised  against   transcendental 





itself  a  programme and not   (yet)  a   full­fledged  philosophy  of   freedom it  not  only 




became   unavoidable   with   Kant's   Copernican   revolution.   Kant   rigorously   restricted 
philosophical   investigation  to  what   is   found  in experience.  He effectively separated 
knowledge sensu stricto from what from then on becomes a reflection on the conditions 
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of  knowledge.   If  knowledge always  contains  an  empirical  element,  and philosophy 
becomes a reflection on knowledge, then the question as to the status of philosophical  
knowledge   itself  must   be   asked.   Can   philosophy   still   claim   to  know  metaphysical 
truths? Is the reflection on the conditions of knowledge itself a form of knowledge, or is  
it something else? How can we claim to know transcendental conditions? If knowledge 





possibility   of   philosophy   is   thus   itself   a   philosophical   question.   Philosophy 
provides an answer to the question concerning its own possibility. Accordingly, 
one can demonstrate the possibility of philosophy only by arguing in a circular 
fashion,  or  philosophy  requires  no  proof  and   is   simply  and absolutely  possible  
(WLnm 12­3 / 89, emp. added).1 




should   remember   that,   in   its   day,  Kant's   transcendentalism was  more   likely   to   be 
misunderstood   than   understood.   A   common  misunderstanding  was   to   take   Kant's 
1 Breazeale's  translation  actually  reads:  "...in  a  circular  fashion,  or,  philosophy  requires  no 
proof ..." This second comma could be read to imply that Fichte affirms that philosophy requires  
no proof, whereas I propose to read this rhetorically: the only proof must be circular, or else 
philosophy remains unfounded. This is affirmed by the passage immediately following this where 
Fichte discusses the foundation of philosophy. This foundation is said to be self-grounding and 
not ungrounded, see WLnm 14 / 91. To be clear, this in no way imputes the opinion to Breazeale  
of considering Fichte's project as non-foundationalist, rather to the contrary. It merely concerns 





in  itself  was not  an object  in  the world,   let  alone an object of  possible  experience 
(human or otherwise),  but a  presupposition necessary to  account  for  experience as 
such.   The   distinction   between   epistemological   and   ontological   claims   might   be 
apparent to us now, but this was not always the case. We should not forget that we 
benefit   from   over   two   centuries   of   philosophical   engagement   with   these   issues. 












What  is   the ground  for   transcendental  philosophy? These,  as   it  were,   internal  and 
systematic  concerns we have  tried to   link to  the more external  concerns (vis  à   vis  
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determinism)   of   demonstrating   transcendental   idealism   as   the   true   philosophy   of 
freedom. Kant's positing of a spontaneous act of synthesis as the highest condition for 
the   possibility   of   experience   I   have   situated   in   an   implicit   debate  with   a   radical  
empiricist project that aimed to demonstrate experience as a purely determined and 
mechanical affair. I will have more to say on this when we turn to the chapters on 
Bergson,   and   especially   on  what   to  make   of  what   I   have   been   calling   real   and 
productive freedom. But as we saw towards the end of Chapter I, the argument that 
attempts   to  demonstrate   the   superiority   of   this   assumption  may  be   formulated   in 
relative independence from a critique of determinism. At the end of that chapter the 
stakes for a philosophy of freedom were formulated as follows:

















idealism   rather   lies   elsewhere.   They  were   concerned  with   an   explanation   of   the 
possibility of the only experience that we have (i.e.,  this one). What do we need to 
assume in order to understand the possibility of experience? Philosophy is a reflection 
on   and   an   attempt   to   explain   how   our   experience   of   the  world   is   possible.   The 
conditions   for   the   possibility   of   experience  were   not   so  much  material   or   causal 
conditions, but first and foremost the conditions of thinkability (although perhaps this 





concept­application and  in  pre­conceptual  awareness,   synthesis   is   still   required and 
must   be   category­governed.   [This   rendered]   permanently   untenable   the   British 
empiricists’ quasi­pictorial account of ideas as copies of sense­impressions.”3 Experience 
already   at   its  most   basic   level   requires   synthesis.   Synthesis   involves   discernment, 
2 See Kant KrV A 110: "There is only one experience ... If one speaks of different experiences they 
are only so many perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience."  
See also the quote from Fichte we have already discussed:  [T]he assumption that objects exist 
outside of  and quite independent of  us [i.e.,  realism],  is  contained within idealism itself (...) 
Indeed, it is the sole aim of all philosophy to provide a derivation of objective truth (ZE  455n / 
38n).
3 Ralph C.S. Walker 2008, 244. See also KrV A79 / B104-5, where Kant claims the same function 
for both the synthesis found in (propositional) judgment and for the synthesis found in uniting 

















positing   and   counterpositing.   Positing   and   counterpositing   stand   in   a   relation   of 
reciprocal determination. And these two related forms of positing are themselves the 







this   positing   results   in   a  Vorstellung.   But   a  Vor­stellung  immediately   entails   a 








and   not­I.   This   is   achieved   when   oppositionality   (further   qualified   as   entailing 
reciprocal determination) is demonstrated as itself a condition for self­positing. Fichte 
want   to   provide   the   groundworks   for   philosophy   but   this   is   not   an  Archimedean 








terms  of  “independent   action”,   or,   as   it   is   formulated   in   the  Practical   Part   of   the 
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Foundations,  as activity and resistance.  Towards the end of  Chapter  II  we saw that 
Fichte  was   forced  to   reintroduce   this  qualitative  difference   to  prevent  a   lapse   into 
dogmatic idealism. This we will need to further clarify. How are we to think I and not­I  
as both quantitatively related and qualitatively distinct? This is very important in light 
of  our   juxtaposition   with  Bergson.   In  Creative   Evolution  Bergson   will   speak   of 
“spirituality” and “materiality” as two tendencies that “invert” each other and hence are 
lower degrees of each other, but also of two forces that  “interrupt”  and  “undo”  each 
other.  They form a continuum (inversion / quantitative relation)  and  they strive to 
undo each other (interruption / qualitative difference). This clearly parallels Fichte ’s 
problem.  As  we   are   beginning   to   see   the   distinction   between   two   perspectives   or 
attitudes (”theoretical” and “practical”) will be crucial in any reconciliation of the two 




















































synthesis   is   not   original,   because   it  does  not  precede   I   and  not­I;   internal   to   the 
argument the three principles are simultaneous.
On   the   level   of   principles   idealism   and   realism/dogmatism   have   distinct 
principles. The transcendental­idealist principle claims superiority because it is able to 









the  Tathandlung.   Tathandlung  should   not   first   and   foremost   be   understood   as   the 
performative activity of  someone,  but  rather  as an attempt  to   formulate  in a more 

















be  understood   in   light   of   the   implicit  discussion  with  a   first  principle  of  material 
determinism. Yet such a "pure" activity only exists in abstracto and hence should always 
be   reintegrated   in   concrete   or   "completed   consciousness".   Hence   the   absolute   I 
necessitates the discussion of I and not­I, that is, of limited I and limited not­I.





reality   is  more  or   less   the  way  it   strikes  us  and  if,   therefore,  we assume  that  our 
knowledge of   the  world   is  more  or   less   correct   (though of   course  always  open  to 
improvement),  philosophy  becomes  not   so  much a   separate   form of  knowledge  or 






4 Fichte:  "Critical  philosophy  is  ...  immanent,  since  it  posits  everything  in  the  I;  dogmatic 
philosophy is transcendent, since is goes beyond the I", GWL 120 / 117.
5 We leave aside here the question of the purported representational nature of all knowledge. If 
with Fichte knowledge becomes thinkable as a forms of conscious activity, then with Bergson the 







we   could   also   try   to   formulate   it   in   a   less   spatial   language,   one   less   inclined   to 
reintroduce   a   subject­object   distinction.  We   could   perhaps   compare   reflection   to 
something like the idea of active adaptation. When we perform a certain task we do not  
perform  it   in   always   the   exact   same  manner.   Bergson,   in  his  wonderful   essay   on 
laughter,  denotes   the   comical   as   the  unadaptive.   It   is  when  someone   continues  as 
though everything were exactly the same as before, i.e., in a rigid, unreflecting kind of 
way, that we feel inclined to laugh at such a person.6  But generally (dinosaurs and 










6 See Le rire in Œuvres, translation: Laughter, An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic (Mineola: 












tried   to   stress   these   links.   Here   self­positing   is   another   word   for   transcendental 




The   immediate  awareness     of  myself   as   being  a   free  agent   is,   as  Frederick 
Neuhouser   argues,   not   to   be   directly   equated   with   transcendental   apperception. 
Neuhouser   distinguishes   between   practical   and   theoretical   subjectivity.   Practical 
subjectivity, i.e., self­determination, a consideration of myself as a free acting agent, 
and  theoretical   subjectivity   (transcendental   synthesis)  differ   for  Neuhouser  because 
where the existence of a subject in some sense results from, or is constituted by, its own 
7 Here understood in the wide sense of having run from the French Revolution (1789) to the First 
World War (1914).
8 Henrich considers the so-called Anglo-Saxon - Continental split to have originated with Fichte, 
although  I  am  not  sure  whether  the  two  sides  as  I  see  them  would  correspond  to  this 
geographical divide. See Henrich 2003, 4. See also the 'Intermezzo' in this thesis.
154
activity, practical subjectivity refers to what he calls a “qualitative constitution”: “Here it 
is not  that  I exist that is up to me, but  how  I exist.”9  But, as Neuhouser also notes, 







striving   and   counterstriving,   of  will,   force,   and   activity,   and   of   the   possibility   of 
becoming   aware   of   such   activity,   we   seem   to   be   moving   away   from   a   purely 
transcendental   investigation of   the  conditions  of  knowledge   towards   something  we 









9 Frederick Neuhouser,  Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 170.
10 Op. cit., 168.
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anything,  and quite  in contrast   to  how Fichte has often been seen,   it  points  to  an 
essential modesty that philosophy must assume. This becomes more clear when we take 
11 See e.g... Franck Fischbach, L'être et l'acte. Enquête sur les fondements de l'ontologie moderne  
de l'agir (Paris: Vrin, 2002) for a novel reading of the philosophy of activity, or more precisely le 
passage de l'acte à l'être in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Marx.
12 One of the more recent attempts in this, though still very interesting and illuminating in its own 
right,  is  Alexis  Philonenko's  reading  of  Fichte,  one  that  relies  heavily  on  the  notion  of  
intersubjectivity. See Alexis Philonenko La Liberté humaine dans la philosophie de Fichte (Paris: 
Vrin, 1980).
13 See Alexis Philonenko, “Une lecture fichtéenne du cartésianisme n'est-elle pas nécessaire?,” in 
Le transcendantal et la pensée moderne (Paris: P.U.F, 1990), 40 and 38 resp. Let me stress that 










(intuition   of   the   I).14  Indeed,   as   Thomas­Fogiel   stresses,   the   distinction   is   radical 
because the adequacy of concept to intuition is no longer guaranteed.15  For Thomas­










of   itself   as   object.   Consciousness   is   activity,   it   is   the   activity   of  Bestimmung,   of 
14 As I have pointed out, Fichte's intuition-concept distinction should not be confused with Kant's. 
See my footnote to Ch. I, Sect. 3.3
15 Thomas-Fogiel  2000,  75.  See  also  the  opening  remarks  to  the  Foundations that  the  First 
Principle "can neither be proved, nor defined" (GWL 91 / 93)
16 Op. cit., 74.
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determination,   and   this,   as  we  have   seen   in   the  Foundations,   entails   two  poles  of 
determinate being and of  determining.  When Fichte  in  "Chapter  One"   invites  us   to 
"think the I", he wants to draw our attention to the activity that is thought. Even if only  
on philosophical  grounds we will  have   to  consider  such activity  as   spontaneous  in 











thought.   As   Thomas­Fogiel   writes:   "Fichte's   discovery   is   the   discovery   of   auto­
referentiality as a model of truth that is radical in way never thematised before."17 It is 
radical because Fichte claims 1.) that there is no alternative to it (except determinism / 


















expressed  through concepts.  But  because   the  thing we are   trying  to  express   is   the 
ground   of   all   determination,   and   of   conceptual   thought   as   such,   it   can   never   be 
adequately expressed in concepts. The I is a "first truth", or as we have called it, a first  
principle, but, as Thomas­Fogiel stresses, such a first truth does not provide us with a 
first  point  of  departure  of  a  deduction.19  Taken as   such,  or  schlechthin,   it  precedes 






after  all,   trying   to  understand  how  our  experience  may  have  come about.  We are 
19 Op. cit., 74.
20 See Fichte: "Hier gibt es keine Gründe; wir sind an der Grenze aller Gründe," Fichte as quoted 










Introductions)   is   the   first   and   only   chapter   of   Fichte's   "new   presentation"   of   the 










distinguishes   the  different  uses  Fichte  makes  of   intuition  during   the  nova  methodo 
period.   First,   he  writes,   there   is   the   intellectual   intuition   of   our   own   free   nature 
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argued   for   from   any   other,  more   fundamental   position.   As   a   first   indubitable   or 
unmediated truth we may, therefore, still retain it as an intuition of I­hood.23 
Third,   is   intuition  as   freely  produced   “fact  of   consciousness”   (iA3).24  Fichte, 
especially in the nova methodo period asks us to “think the I” and observe how we do 
this. Our mind jumps from A to B. If we attend to what happens in thought we become 
aware of   its  wavering,  “floating”  nature.  Hence we must abstract  from the normal, 
21 Breazeale 1998, 594.
22 Op.  cit. 595.  Breazeale  writes  that  in  the  Tathandlung “the  identity  of  the  I  precedes its 
differentiation into a subject and an object of reflection” (loc.cit, emp. in original). As I have tried 
to demonstrate the only sense we should give to this notion of precedence is not a temporal but a 
transcendental type of precedence. Although it is a first principle, all effort must be made to 
understand such productive activity as simultaneous with, and thus nothing different from, the 
“production” of producer and product, of I and not-I.
23 The neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain (albeit in discussion with Bergson, not Fichte) 
explains the notion of  "philosophical  intuition"  as follows:  "Let  us  add that  the word  direct 
knowledge  may  signify  either  without  an  intermediary  object  first  known (for  example,  the 
apprehension of the intelligible realities proportionate to our intelligence), or  which does not 
result  from a reasoning (the perception of  first  principles,  for  example)",  in  'Preface to  the 
Second Edition' (1929) in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, Notre Dame, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2007 [1929, 1913] after the 2nd edition, translated by M.L. Andison, 30n




from our individual I,   the more we will  approach this pure I.  This use of  intuition 
directs the attention of consciousness unto itself, and is therefore a form of intellectual 
intuition,   but,   as   Breazeale   points   out,   “there   is   something   deeply   ambiguous, 
incomplete and merely transitional” about  it.25  We are asked to perform a series of 










as   it   were,   allows   us   to   become   aware   (in   an   act   of   intuition)   of   the   absolute  
spontaneity of consciousness. The fourth use (iA4) is first properly philosophical in that 
it takes this as a point of departure for a philosophical analysis in order to see how this 
standpoint allows us  to understand the "genesis"  (Breazeale) of  finite consciousness 
(limited I and limited not­I).  iA3 thus brings us to the proper starting point for the 
25 Op. cit., 599
26 Op. cit., 600.








the   indubitability   of   the  cogito.29  Even   more   so,   the   raising   of   oneself   to   the 
transcendental or philosophical viewpoint must itself (i.e. the raising of oneself, this 
transition, this abstraction) be taken up in the meditation on knowledge.
Transcendental  philosophy   is   immanent   in   that  we  are   confined  to   the  only 
experience available to us. Through a series of reflections we come to understand that 
experience   is   a   spontaneous   event.   But   this   is   a   philosophical   reflection.   Such   a 
reflection involves expression in concepts and this inevitably reifies and misportrays 
what we are trying to explain. We inadvertedly shift from one perspective to another, 






experience.  When we do not  pay proper  attention  to  what   this   involves  we might 
surreptitiously be lead to posit what we have thus abstracted as somehow existing on 













when   towards   the   end   of   the   article   he   notes   that  there   might   be  “something 
fundamentally misguided about the operative premise of this paper: namely that one 
can somehow  separate  “intuiting”  from  “thinking”  and develop a methodology of the 
former in isolation from the latter”.32 “Thinking” or experience is what takes place all by 
itself. “Intuiting” is the philosophical reflection on “thinking”. But these two, as indeed 
Breazeale   notes,   are   two   components   of   the   same.   Although   to   reflect   on   our 
experience we abstract from particulars and use concepts, we must always be able to 
return to the concrete particular.
30 E.g. when he compares the abstraction that Fichte demands of us with Husserl's epoché. See op. 
cit., 611.
31 This notion of a transcendental field has its own interesting history in 20th Century philosophy. 
As Goddard points out Deleuze in one of his very last texts "Immance: A Life" explicitely refers to 
Fichte's  in  order  to  understand this  transcendental  field  as "life".  For  a  discussion see J.-C. 
Goddard 2007a. See Deleuze "Immanence: A Life", in Pure Immanence (New York: Zone Books, 
2001): 25-34.








that   this  world  determines  me.33  When  I   reflect  on   the  conditions  of   such  a  dual 
relation   I   come   to   posit   determination   as   a   spontaneous   phenomenon.   This 
phenomenon I must try to express and to do so I will need to refer to the terms that the 
practical perspective has put at my disposal. It cannot be "the thing" which is the cause  
of   such   spontaneous  determination  because   things  only  combine mechanically,  and 
such a combination can only give us an aggregate. Hence I will call it I. The ground of 
determination   lies   in   the   self­determination   of   the   I.   The   real   ground   for   the 
determination by the I is the independent activity of the I. 








33 Again we must keep the polyvalent meaning of the original term in mind.  Bestimmung means 
determination and limitation but also destination and vocation. Furthermore it brings to mind 




material   necessity,   it   cannot   (without   falling   into   transcendent   idealism)   by   itself 
account   for  that  which  it   determines.   As   Fichte  noted,  what   occasions   this   is   not 
something a theoretical reflection can account for. After much reflection we must finally 







philosophical   landscape,   indeed   the  world   itself,   as   it  was  at   the  end  of   the  19th 
Century no longer resembled the one from the 1790’s. Just think of the collection of 
German lands that was to become the German state, or of Revolutionary France and the 
Belle  epoque  of  the Third Republic.  Or more fundamentally:   the move to the cities, 
rapidly  increasing industrialisation,  increasing class­tensions, the rise of mass media 
and mass transport. Or yet philosophically more pertinent: the development from a 
genetic  philosophical  account   of   experience   to   a   pluralistic   scientific   theory   of 
evolution,1  from a  mechanistic­atomistic   science   to   the   theory  of   thermo­dynamics, 
think of the revolutions in mathematics, of experimental psychology, the theory of the 
electron.2  Think finally of Schopenhauer, Stirner and Nietzsche, Maine de Biran and 
1 See e.g.,  H.  Müller-Sievers,  Self-generation,  Biology,  Philosophy and Literature around 1800 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) for a discussion of the relation between philosophy 
and evolution.
2 Much excellent work has been done on Bergson's relation to the sciences that I do not propose 
to repeat here, e.g. the work of Milič Čapek, Pete Gunter, Paul-Antoine Miquel and Keith Ansell-








concepts   of   force,   energy,  Kraft  and  Wirkung.  As  we  have   seen  Fichte  ambiguates 
between   a   transcendental   inquiry   into   the   conditions   of   knowledge   and   an 
understanding  of   the world   in  terms of  activity.  When  I   initially  came  to   read  the 






of  different  rhythms of  duration,  of   the spiritual  and  the material  as  being  inverse 
degrees of each other. But he also speaks of the spiritual and the material as striving to  
undo each others work. Hence the parallels are clearly there. But as I continued reading 
Fichte   I   saw   that   this   only   does   justice   to   one   aspect   of   his   thought,   a   thought, 
furthermore,   that  was  not   really   seen  as   two  for  him.   I   thus  came  to   stress  more 
strongly the transcendental aspect of his project. 
Guerlac,  Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006).
3 As witnessed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.
4 The scientific interest in movement is captured beautifully in the photographs of Étienne-Jules 
Marey (1830-1904). See  Georges Didi-Huberman and Laurent Mannoni,  Mouvements de l'air.  
Étienne-Jules Marey, photographe des fluides (Gallimard, 2004). Didi-Huberman explicitly links 
Marey's work to Bergson.
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As we have come to see, Fichte’s thought does not clearly distinguish between an 












Wille,  Trieb,  Wechsel,  Wechseltun,  Wechselwirkung,   Kraft,  Wirkung  and  Wirksamkeit. 
Where most of these terms may be translated into English without too much trouble, it 
is the tandem Kraft and Wirkung that poses a real problem for translation. A common 
translation using terms of Latin origin is as “force” or  “power”  and “effect”.  Wirkung 
may also be translated somewhat awkwardly with “working out”, as work being done 
(from wirken, to work). What is truly difficult to render in modern English is the inner 
relation that  Kraft  and Wirkung have and that the Latin force and effect do not.  In a 
very illuminating entry on force  in the Vocabulaire européen des philosophies Françoise 
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Balibar   discusses   the   difference   between   the   German   terms   and   their   Latin 
counterparts. That there is a real conceptual difference between force and Kraft may be 





Kraft  and  Wirkung  that   is   lost   in  French,   and  by  association   in  English.  This   first 
became noticeable when Leibniz, who of course was a German, was writing in French 









conserves   itself,  which  means   that   energy   remains   constant.   The   conservation   (Fr: 
conservation) of energy is an idea that was definitively introduced in 1847 by Hermann 
von Helmholtz   in  his  Über  die  Erhaltung  der  Kraft:   in  a  closed system energy  is  a 
constant value. But as  the English translation of  the title  indicates,  the notion of  a 
5  Howard Caygill, "Life and Energy," Theory, Culture & Society 26 (6) (2007).
6  Françoise Balibar, “Force,” in Vocabulaire européen des philosophies (Le Robert, 2004), 462.
7 Op. cit., 458.
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value­constant energy entails a drastic conceptual shift. The Erhaltung of Kraft becomes 
the  conservation  of  energy.  Where conservation seems to entail   the idea that energy 
preserves itself and is only divided or changes location,  Erhaltung  also has the more 




out,  Kraft  is related to substance, as that which maintains itself.8 Kraft  is internal to 













when we attempt  to  combine  this   law of  conservation (the first   law) with what   is 
known as the second law of thermo­dynamics, one   formulated at around the same 
8 Op. cit., 462.
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is   then   extended   to   the   universe   it   is   no   longer   able   to   express   the   objective 
permanence of a certain quantity within a system, since the answer to the question of 




energy   is   concerned  with   the   relationship   of   a   fragment   of   this  world   to   another 
fragment rather than with the nature of the whole” (EC 701 / 156). The second law, 
the law of the degradation of physical changes into heat and a uniform distribution of  
heat   among   bodies,   is   of   a   different   order.   This,   Bergson   writes,   is  “the   most 
metaphysical of the laws of physics” (ibid.). It tells us that “visible and heterogeneous 
changes”  will  be diluted  in to  “invisible  and homogeneous”  ones.  This  clearly does 




9 Rudolf Clausius first formulated the second law in 1850 in his article "Über die bewegende Kraft  




you  will,   or   the   actuality   of  Kraft  consists   of   a  “working­out”,   it   spends   itself,   it 
undergoes a qualitative change. In the chapters on Fichte we may well understand the 
Tathandlung  in   such   a   way   (hence   the   importance   of   the   complementary   non­
transcendental account of his thought). As we have seen, it is neither agent and action, 
and both agent and action combined. Since its essence consists of a “working­out” (as 
“performative   activity”   or  Tathandlung)   it  “results”  in   a   determining   pole   and   a 
determined   pole   (agent   and   action,   I   and   not­I).  We  may   consider   it   as   activity 
schlechthin, thus abstracting from the related notions of agent and action, and then it 
may be said to be “absolute” and "without lack" (hence neither agent nor action). If we 






the  Foundations  that  we  mentioned  above,   anthropomorphic   roots.  With   “striving”, 
“will” and “drive” this is clear. Handlung refers to the operations of the hand, Wirkung 
to work. And even Kraft probably finds its origin in the “krafts des armes”, in its original 
meaning of  the force of  the hand.10  Kraft  probably derives  from  graph,   in German: 
fassen, greifen, traces of which we find in the English to grab, to grasp, and older still, to 
grope.  Kraft  may thus be linked to  Begriff  or concept.  Another possible and related 
origin is found in crapft, meaning hook (Ger: Gabel, think perhaps also of “crab”), the 

















to   have   little   in   common,   such   a   relation   is   precisely   what   is   the   case   in   the 
“anthropomorphic” notions of Kraft and Wirkung.
11 What is interesting to note is that, based on citations in the Oxford English Dictionary, this word 
“craft” appears in fact to be much older than the word “force” that in time has come to supplant 
it.  References as early as 888, 893 and 897 are mentioned in the OED whereas the earliest 
mention of “force” stem from 1300 and 1303. Energy is first mentioned in 1585.
12 Caygill 2007, 19. 












clearly  the philosophical  and conceptual  problems this  entails.   In  contrast,  Bergson 
always attempts to unravel a certain specific and rather concrete problem that appears 
within   a   certain   specific   scientific   context   (e.g.,   the  nature  of   conscious   states,   of 
memory, or of evolution). This complements well the abstract philosophy of Fichte. But 
















this  problem appears  and  what  makes   it   so  difficult   to  deal  with   is   generally   left  
undiscussed. The chapters on Fichte make clear that a perfectly unified account is not a 











much of   their  philosophy   to  a  proper  understanding  of  what   it  means   to   say   that 
experience is spontaneous or durational. The rigorous and abstract philosophy of Fichte 
and Bergson's  agile  and concrete one will  ultimately  move beyond  juxtaposition  in 
order to fuse or "interpenetrate".
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Before   turning   to   our   study  of   Bergson,   I  will   briefly   indicate  how  Fichte's 
philosophy may be of help in our reading of Bergson. Fichte starts immediately with 












problem. Duration and space are  inverse degrees of  each other and the concept  of 
memory is said to incorporate both. But as we shall come to see memory is  duration. 
Although the two are different principles, space is secondary in relation to duration, 
now   affirmed   as   something   that   with   Fichte   we   could   say   is   an   absolute   and 
unconditional   principle.  All   reality   is  movement   and  movement   is   of   the   order  of 
duration.
Fichte posits  Tathandlung  as first principle. Such a principle by itself assumes 
positing   and   counterpositing,   activity   and  passivity,   determination   and  determinate 
being.   It   is   a   first   principle   because   only   on   the   basis   of   it   can  we   understand 
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oppositionality and determinate being. Speaking with Bergson, only on the basis of 
spontaneous  or  durational  organisation can we understand the different  degrees of 




resists   the   other.   Fichte   thus   appeals   to   "independent   activity"   or   to   a   qualitative 
difference between activity and resistance.






must  now reconcile   two  competing  claims:   spirituality  and  materiality  are   "inverse 
degrees", yet and at the same time, the one "interrupts" the other: spirituality aims to 













What  this   shows  is   that   this   is   inherent   in any attempt  that   tries   to  explain 
experience by appealing only   to  what  may be   found in  experience,   that   is,   to  any 






One  last   remark before  we  turn  to  Bergson.  The analysis   in  this   thesis  only 
extends to Creative Evolution (1907). Part of the reason is one of economy. To have also 
included the latter works, especially  The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), 
would   not   have   allowed   for   the  minimum of   rigour   required   in   terms   of   textual 




significance"   and   "metaphysical   import"   of   this   solution.   Religious   and   moral 






experience.   There   is   a   "shock"   that   calls   forth   "infinite   striving".   To   what   extent 
theoretical understanding may fathom this we have left undetermined. In this thesis I  











IV. TWO FORMS OF ORGANISATION
1. The problem of free will and determinism
In his doctoral thesis Time and Free Will (1889) Bergson attempts to unravel the age­old 






way   a   certain   specific   phenomenon   has   been   understood   (generally   within   the 
sciences), then an appeal to our own lived experience to see whether we feel that this 










to   the   quite   novel   conclusion   that   the  way   conscious   states   are   organised   differs 
radically from the way that measurable phenomena are said to be organised. These two 
forms of organisation Bergson calls  duration and space, and we will  discuss this  in 
detail.  Because conscious states have a  different   form of  organisation measurement 
inadvertently changes or misrepresents their nature.
The perspective  of  duration  thus  allows him  to  criticize  determinism,   to   the 
extent   that   it   claims   to   apply   to   conscious   phenomena,   but   also   allows   him   to 
undermine the assumptions of the advocates of free will. In fact, Bergson will come to 
reject both determinism and the idea of free will. He will show that both determinism 
and   free   will   have   failed   to   understand   the   organisation   of   conscious   states. 
Furthermore, this is to misunderstand the true nature of time. Time should not be seen 





1 Hence some readers are left puzzled by the authorised translation of the original French title An 
Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (though retained as subtitle) to Time and Free 
Will. Bergson rejects both our common understanding of time and our common understanding of 
free will. The two terms of the title thus only offer a negative indication of the contents.Bergson, 
as son of an English mother, was fluent in English (as well as a number of other languages). We 
benefit  enormously  from  the  fact  that  Bergson  scrupulously  checked  and  authorised  the 
translations of all his mayor works. Combined with the already very lucid style of writing and the 
very low level of rhetoric found therein, makes that there are very few problems of translation.  




Bergson   objects   to   the   conclusion   that   because   psychic   states  may   be   reduced   to 















able   to   show precisely  how a   stimulus  determines  a   conscious   state   some kind  of 
measurable   effect   is   required.   Rather   than   assuming   that   influence   equates 
determinability,  we will  have to inquire whether measurability  as such is  permitted 
when   speaking   of   psychic   states.  Measurement  must   be   understood   as   a  way   of 
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organising experience. To determine whether measurement may be faithfully applied to 












































































progression   of   numbers  we   imagine   as   an   uninterrupted   line,   with   the   numbers 
themselves as points along this line. When we manipulate numbers we take them as 
spatial or extended object, but when we are done with them, when the outcome has 









numbers   is  understood  to  be  continuous.  This  continuity  and  infinite  divisibility  of 


































































state   themselves   change   in   this   process   of   reflection.   A   clearly   perceived   psychic 
element is no longer the same as the previously only vaguely perceived element. This in 
turn has an effect on the whole of which they are part.
The   interesting   difference   between   the   objective   and   the   subjective   orders 







3 See Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Tomlinson, H. (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 95-8.
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subjective element is either virtual or it is realised but between these two states there is  
a   crucial  difference.  When an  objective  or  possible  element   is   realised   through  an 
awareness of it, this consists of an uncovering of something already present; as Deleuze 
writes, a limitation is removed and existence is merely "added" to it. Therefore, it does 
not   change   the   “mental   image”  we   have   of   the   object   in   question.4  But  when   a 
subjective  or   virtual   element   is   realised   this   results   in  a  qualitative   change  of   the 

















4 Op. cit., 97.


















depends on the synthesis   itself.  Hence neither  side pre­exists  the other.  As Deleuze 
writes, whereas the possible is subject to the rule of resemblance and limitation, the 










can  be   “completely  and  adequately  known”,  whereas   the  objective  only  allows   for 
infinite approximation (“a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be 
substituted for the idea we have of it”). This must have seemed counter­intuitive at 
















7 Worms, 2004, 47.
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Deleuze   notes,   it   concerns   two   forms   of  multiplicity,   or   better   still,   two   types   of 
organisation. As Deleuze writes, commenting on the exact same passage:
[There] is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, 
of   quantitative   differentiation,   of  difference   in   degree;   it   is   a   numerical 
multiplicity,  discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in 
pure   duration:   It   is   an  internal   multiplicity   of   succession,   of   fusion,   of 
organization, of heterogeneity, of  qualitative discrimination, or of  difference in 
kind;   it   is   a  virtual   and   continuous  multiplicity   that   cannot   be   reduced   to 
numbers.8
3.1 Duration and Tathandlung
The   specific   relations   that   hold   between   the   elements   of   a   multiplicity   and   the 
multiplicity itself, or, as in our example, between the things I highlight in someone's 























The   distinction   between   subjective   and   objective   knowledge   entails   two   forms   of 
organisation, or two ways in which parts relate to wholes. After the passage that we 
quoted   above   Bergson   drops   the   terms   subjective   and   objective   in   favour   of   a 
distinction between two types of multiplicities. There are, as he writes, “two kinds of 
multiplicity,   two possible  senses of   the word  'distinguish',   two conceptions,   the one 
qualitative and the other quantitative, of the difference between same and other” (DI, 





9 I prefer the term “organisation” over “multiplicity”. For one, as Jankélévitch notes,  the term 
organisation more effectively overcomes the opposition of same and other (1999, 37). Deleuze 
rightly praises Bergson for his novel use of the notion multiplicity as continuum (Deleuze, 1988, 
38) but I find that Deleuze has a tendency to reify the notion of virtual multiplicity, placing too 
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In  Time and Free Will  duration is seen as the form of organisation proper to 





are   clear   differences   to   be   found.   The   “unrolling”   or   flow   of   conscious   states   is 
continuous but also heterogeneous. But this heterogeneity does not automatically entail 
discrete   or   distinctly  different   states,   rather,   the  one   “permeates”   the   other;   states 
“interpenetrate”, they merge to become new states, or they divide into separate states. 
Hence these states are “confused”, not discrete. When I simply observe myself and try 








Spatial   elements   can   be   counted  because   they  pre­exist   their   realisation,   in 
precisely   the   same way   that  possibles  do.  Durational  elements   cannot  be  counted, 
rather, they are “gathered” (59 / 86). Bergson compares it to that of melody (59­60 / 
86­7). Take a fairly homogeneous event,  writes Bergson, such as a church bell  that 
great  an  emphasis  on  structure.  Organisation  not  only  entails  a  relation  of  parts  to  whole 




This means stripping them of  individuating qualities.  Keeping score is  done via the 
medium of space. But when we listen to the church bell as though it were a melody we 












10 In his wonderful little essay Listening Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of the art of listening, or even of 
listening  as  a  model  of  truth  superior  to  the visual.  Truth  conceived  as  listening  would  be 
adequate to a mode of presence "that is not a being (at least not in the intransitive, stable,  
consistent  sense  of  the  word),  but  rather  a  coming and  a  passing,  an  extending and  a 
penetrating... It is a present in waves on a swell, not in a point on a line; it is a time that opens 
up, that is hollowed out, that is enlarged or ramified, that envelops and separates, that becomes  
or is turned into a loop, that stretches out or contracts, and so on."  What is remarkable is the 
near-total absence of any engagement with Bergson in Nancy's work, perhaps symptomatic of 
the forgotten debt to Bergson of  so much of  contemporary French philosophy.  See  Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Listening, trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 13. 
With Jankélévitch one cannot but think of medieval polyphonic music, but also of Sati and Ravel, or 
the contemporary composer Simeon Ten Holt, as being perfect representations of the continuity 








Measurable   time   is   only   possible   on   the   basis   of   lived   time.   That   time   is 
measurable is often assumed to be demonstrable through the observation of a regularly 







and  Free  Will  has   so   far   received   little  attention  in   the   literature.  This     is   strange 
because, as Worms stresses, the question of the nature of movement is, or at least for 
Bergson,   "the  metaphysical   question  par   excellence".11  Furthermore  we   know   from 
Matter   and  Memory  that   Bergson  will   come   to   unequivocally   affirm   the   reality   of 
movement. Indeed, reality as such will be claimed to be in perpetual motion. 
Yet  in  Time and Free Will  Bergson's  position seems oddly ambiguous when it 
comes   to  phenomenon of  movement.  Rather   than asserting   the  objective   reality  of 
movement he writes: "Motion, in so far as it is a passage from one point to another, is a 











































the question of   the "absolute reality  of  space"  (62 /  91). Space  is  referred to  as  a 
"faculty"   (faculté,  65 /  97).   It  pertains  only   to  external  objects,   it   is  a  principle  of 
juxtaposition and simultaneity. It is a faculty for making quantitative distinctions and 















perceive at each  individual moment  is  a corresponding  position of  the hand of  the 
pendulum. Hence I would not see any motion at all. It is only because "[w]ithin myself 





The   interpenetration  of  psychic   states  allows   for   continuity  but,   on  Bergson's  own 
account, does not allow for any "mutual externality". That I distinguish my conscious 
states is  due to having, as it were, "mixed in" space. Psychic states form a continuity. If I 




In a  word,   there  are   two elements   to  be  distinguished  in motion,   the space 
traversed and the act by which we traverse it, the successive positions [of the 
hand of the pendulum] and the synthesis of these positions. The first of these 





















object  in motion. This seems to be precisely what Bergson  is  talking about. 13  If  we 
assume no prior knowledge or experience of movement and each instant appears as an 
instantaneous   flash   of   light,   what   would   induce   us   to   think   that   these   separate 
phenomena combine to form one single instance of movement? Rather, what we would 
experience would be a lighting­up here, then another there and a third one over there; 
a   series   of   different   positions  but  nothing   like   the  perception  of   a  moving  object. 






that   a   swinging  pendulum  is   an  object   that   changes   in  distance   in   respect   to   the  
observer.  To be aware of  a change  in distance I  need depth­perception.  But  depth­
perception is dependent on real movement in the lenses of the eyes. If the eyes are 





13 On further reflection I have come to doubt whether the following is really an argument against 
Bergson or in fact the use of one of his own arguments against himself. More specificly, whether  
I am not simply using the critique of the cinematographical method from  Creative Evolution 
against the early Bergson of  Time and Free Will. However, since the discussion is instructive 
about the limitations of considering movement as only a subjective phenomenon, and Bergson 
does seem to leave this matter implicit in Time and Free Will I have decided to retain it.
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blob of colour on a screen to be a train racing right at me. To be able to interpret  











real   movement.   Bergson   discusses   the   problematic   dual   nature   of   movement   as 
trajectory  and  as   “act”  but  only   effectively  deals  with   this  question   in  Matter  and 
Memory.14  In  Time   and   Free  Will  he   distinguishes   between   the   divisibility   of   the 
trajectory, something spatial, and the indivisibility of its progression, which is an act of 
consciousness.   The   account   from  Matter   and   Memory  is   in   agreement   with   this 
distinction between a divisible trajectory and the indivisibility of its progress. What will  
change, however, is that, where in Time and Free Will this is an act of consciousness, in 
14 MM  326-9  /  191-3,  taken  up  again  in  EC  755-9  /  197-9,  under  the  heading  "The 
Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought". See also Worms 2004, 69.
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Matter and Memory Bergson will unequivocally claim the  reality of movement. Hence 

















give   the  virtuality  of  duration   itself  an  objective  consistency",   this   it   is  able   to  do 
because   "memory   is   the   coexistence   of   degrees   of   difference."15  Degrees   between 
duration and space, we might add.  Whether he was aware of this or not I would agree 










following  point:  namely   that  the  principle  of   this  act   cannot  be   found   in   the  












16 Worms, 2004, 69.































qualitative  nature   of   the   synthesis  of   the  mind  we  have   to  do  with   two   radically 
different types of organisation. 
As for the believers in a free will, they equally make the mistake of representing 

















What   of   this   more   positive   notion   of   freedom   of   which   Bergson   spoke   in   the 
Introduction to Time and Free Will? Bergson's account is much richer than I will be able 
to do justice to in the space allowed. As we know, for Bergson, our conscious states 
















18 See the notion of "reflex actions" on 112 / 170.
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the  entirety  of   the   soul,   then   this   can  no   longer  be  a  merely  disinterested   choice 
between alternative  futures.  Here  it   is   the soul   in  its  entirety  that speaks;   it  not a  
question of choice but of  expression,  of becoming one with oneself.  Indeed, using a 














speaking   be   foreseen   as   the   act   takes   up   all   that   has   gone   before,  making   pure 
repetition impossible de jure. There is no discontinuity here that would allow us to stop 













V. RHYTHMS OF DURATION
1. From Time and Free Will to Matter and Memory





as   such,   between   the  measurable   or   quantifiable   nature   of   the   stimulus   and   its 






















































1 Worms, 2004, 151.
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seen as produced by some act purely exterior to the elements. If the act of synthesis 




























repeatedly calls  a   “virtual”   state,   then memory  too must  ultimately be seen to    be 
duration.   For   it   was   always   duration   that   was   the   principle   of   qualitative 
interpenetration, hence memory too is on par with duration. As our reading progresses 











is   rejected   in   favour   of   different   activities.   The   world   is   one   of   activities,   and 





that   Bergson  writes   "we   cannot   bring   ourselves   to   leave   in   suspense";   this   is   the 
problem of the union of soul and body (317 / 180). In the fourth and last chapter of the 





crescendo   that   attempts   to   overcome  what   he   calls   the   triple   opposition   of   the 
unextended and  the  extended,  of  quality  and quantity,  and  finally,  of   freedom and 
necessity   (373   /   244).   This   may   be   called   a  metaphysical   problem   in   order   to 
distinguish   it   from   the   ethical   problem  of   freedom.  As  Worms   notes:   "Bergsonian 
freedom is attributed to a metaphysical reality as such, before taking on a moral or 
psychological  significance. This freedom, furthermore,  is  not to be constructed  in  a 
priori fashion by the philosopher, but is to be observed at work in experience of history 
itself."2  This  metaphysical  problem  is  one of  how to show that   freedom is    not  an 
emperium in empirio,  but that all of existence is free by right. To stress the difference 
with   that  other  notion  of  metaphysical   freedom,   it   is   exactly   an  attempt   to  make 
freedom   intelligible   as   operative  within  the   material   world.   Kant   separated   his 
understanding of the world as bound by universal and fixed laws, a world governed by 
2 Frédéric Worms, Introduction à Matière et Mémoire de Bergson (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1997), 207. Fichte also stressed that the philosopher is there to observe, rather than 
construct, e.g.: "one is supposed to act internally and observe what one is doing, ..., one has to 
ask the other person to perform the action in question", WLnm 28 / 110.
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determinism, from his belief in the freedom of the soul. His metaphysical solution was 




















of   freedom   in   a   debate  with   determinism,   and   it   asks   how  we   can   come   to   an 
understanding   that   neither   sacrifices   our   conviction   in   the   reality   of   freedom 
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Between  the   first  problem of   the  relation  of  body  and soul  and  the  second, 
metaphysical  problem of the  union  of body and soul, a rather remarkable change in 
perspective   takes   place.   As  Worms   already   noted,   freedom   should   not   be   left   to 
philosophical  a   priori  deductions,   as   there   is   a   real   experience  of   freedom  that   is 
available to us. Between the first practical problem of the relation of body and soul and 
the second metaphysical problem of unity we will witness a rather drastic shift from the 











operative  in this  work.   It  will  allow us  to  understand  the body as  both something 









conditioned   knowledge   and   knowledge   of   conditions   (the   empirical   and   the 
transcendental). However, one form of knowledge is said to be adequate to science and 


















of   duration   and   space   but   its   attempt   to   account   for   the  necessary   inner   relation 












Bergson's  second work  is  sub­titled "An Essay on the Relation of   the Body and the 
Spirit". This relation will be shown to be one of limitation. The body is a mechanism of  
limitation "with a view towards action". After an elaborate argument Bergson will come 
4 See  Worms 1997 for  MM;  Worms  2004  and  Jankélévitch  1999  for  his  entire  work;  a  good 
introduction to DI and MM is given in Guerlac 2006.
5 For discussion of Bergon’s relevance to contemporary neuro-science see the collection Bergson 
Et  Les  Neurosciences:  Actes  Du  Colloque  International  de  Neuro-Philosophie  (Le  Plessis-
















idea  of   image   that  he   feels  he   can   show  the   inadequacy  of   idealism and   realism. 
Idealism starts from the world as it is given to me in experience. It is this givenness that 
accounts   for   the   certainty   of   the   idealist's   claims.   It   then   attempts   to  deduce   the 
objectivity   of   the  world   from   the   structure   of   consciousness.   The   problem   is   that 
because the idealist denies the objectivity of the world the harmony of the structure of 







perception   that   becomes   the   accident   (ibid.).   Where   idealism   claims   a   "centred" 




But is   there not a postulate common to both? Indeed, says Bergson,  there  is.  Both 
assume that "perception has a wholly speculative interest; [that] it is pure knowledge" 

























Both   kinds   of   influences   are   real;   the   difference   lies   in   how   the   organism 
responds.  An  action   that   is   selected   is   retained  or   perceived,   this  means   it   is  not 
responded to immediately. There is an interval between excitation and response, and 
this is what makes perception a "virtual action". Perception is not some superfluous 
copy  whose  usefulness  we could  never  understand;   rather  perception   is   the  whole 
sequence of received excitation,  interval and executed response. To this virtual action 












of   a   larger   cycle;   it   is,   as   Bergson  writes,   “on   the  way   to   action”.   Because   the 
appropriate response first needs to be executed it is not yet (the whole of) an action, 






Bergson,   concrete   phenomena   are   generally   a  mixture   of   different   ideal   types   or 













































said to exists  consists  of a continuous effort  of  integration and reintegration.  Every 
organism constantly integrates new experiences and reintegrates these new experiences 
with all of its past experiences. For Bergson we are all in time, and time is not in us. But  


































calling   back   depends   on   reproductive   imagination   (KrV   A   121).   But   reproductive 
imagination   could   only   take   place   if   there  were   already   an   image   to  work  with. 
Reproductive  imagination is empirical and subjective;  it   is  dependent on productive 
imagination,  which   alone   takes   place  a   priori  (KrV  A   121,   118).   The   productive 
synthesis of the imagination is related to the transcendental unity of apperception; it is  
an  a   priori  condition   for   the   possibility   of   all   composition   of   the   manifold   in 
imagination (KrV A 118). For Kant, too, reproduction is the special case and production 
is an on­going synthesis that is a necessary condition for experience as such. 








the content  of  experience,   that  is,  as  a  principle  of  unity  that   is  separate  from the 












indeed,  is  near  impossible  to demonstrate,  even  if  only  for  the fact  that practically  
everything shares something with everything else and nothing shares everything with 











us   to  determine   our   perception.   Perception   does   not   come   to   us   ready­made   but 
involves   a   synthetic   effort.  Memory   too   needs   to   be   actualised.  Rather   than   first 
perceiving   an   object   and   then   attempting   to   determine   it   by   past   perceptions, 
recognition (which is more properly understood as a determination) is the result of 
memory being  contemporaneous  with  perception.7  To  assume  the  perception  of  an 
object qua object is to beg the question of how this is possible.











crystallisation.   As   he   writes   in   the   case   of   listening,   or   rather,   hearing   and 
understanding someone speak:
We have here a continuous movement, by which the nebulosity of the idea is 
condensed   into   distinct   auditory   images,   which,   still   fluid,   will   be   finally 
solidified as they coalesce with the sounds materially perceived. At no moment is 





What  we   perceive   is   thus   half  memory,   half   perception,   hence   Bergson   calls   it   a 
memory­image.8
3.1 My body, this present, this action
Pure   memory,   pure   perception   and   the   memory­image   constitute   a   single   and 
continuous movement that is our experience (276 / 133). Bergson distinguished "pure" 





















The   present   is   "effected"   by   perception,   perception   being   precisely   the   activity   of 
selection. This section is what we call the material world, claims Bergson. If time itself  








































ever  meet.  Bergson   thus  writes   that   idealism assumes  already  existing   concepts  or 
ideas,  whereas,  as  we have   seen,   recognition   is  a  not  a   case  of  a  preformed  idea 
matching a ready­made perception, but rather, there is an always already mixed image 
that is part condensed past experience, part selection from received excitations (320 / 
183).   Materialism   fails   equally   in   that   it   substitutes   for   true   experience   a 
"disarticulated" and "disfigured" one, one already organised in light of our interests in 
the   world   (ibid.).   Hence   materialism   already   assumes   the  existence   of   discrete 




philosophy,   namely   that   all   knowledge   is   relative   and   that   ultimate   reality   is 
unknowable (ibid.).





















185).   That   is,   we   would   no   longer   be   restricted   to   the   Kantian   limitations   on 
knowledge.
Bergson therefore suggests a two­part method: to work against the utilitarian 













intuition,  but   an  adaptation  of   the   real   to   the   interests  of  practice  and   the 










Kantian   teachers.   Neither   for   Kant,   nor   for   Fichte,   did   transcendental   philosophy 





during   the   intervening   period   it   had   become   conceptually   plausible   to   distinguish 
between a form of  habitual   thought,  adequate to a static,  Newtonian world, and a 
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(direct)   experience   of  mobile,   becoming   reality.   For   Bergson,   Kant's   conditions   of 








Where   Chapter   I   had   as   as   subtitle:   "Of   the   Selection   of   Images   for  Conscious 






thought   and   perception   are  merely   unextended   qualities   and   the  world   a   purely 
extended  and  quantitative  multiplicity,   then   it   is  hard   to   see  how  the  mind   could 
represent the world. It could only lead to an epi­phenomenal mind, an idea Bergson 
thoroughly  criticises   in Chapter   II.11  If  mind and world are separated  in   this   triple 
manner, then it would seem that freedom would only pertain to the super­sensible. But 
9 See also Worms, 1997, 191.
10 See also Worms, op. cit., 193-4.
11 See also the later essay "The Soul and the Body" in PM.
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In a  series  of   four   carefully  numbered steps Bergson attempts   to  demonstrate  that 
movement is real, indivisible and absolute, and that it  is the division of matter into 
independent bodies that is an illusion (see MM 324­52 / 188­217). Movement is now 
simply   asserted   as   fact   by   Bergson;   something   we  may   easily   become   aware   of 
whenever we lift up our arm (324 / 188). But we tend to ignore this fact because we 




"thing"   (325  /  190).  Only  when  the  movement  has   stopped   can  we  determine   its 
trajectory. But then it would no longer be in motion. Hence we stand to confuse two 
very different phenomena.















contradict   with   our   understanding   of   space.   To   determine   the   distance   between 
locations in a qualitative space we need to recourse to an underlying homogeneous 
grid.  The notion of an encapsulating space leads to an infinite regress of encapsulating 
spaces.   Therefore,   if   space   is   absolute,   then  we   cannot  have  absolute   positions   in 






12 This point is further developed in his discussion with Einstein and the Peter and Paul examples. 
The point is that the only privileged point in space can only ever be my perspective. See Henri 
Bergson,  Duration and  Simultaneity,  trans.  M.  Lewis  and Jacobs,  L.  (Manchester:  Clinamen 
Press, 1999).
13 Whether this applies to all branches of mathematics and more specifically to any developments 
that Bergson was not or could not have been aware of I will have to leave to more knowledgeable 
people. 
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react   to  each  other.  Appealing   to   the  works  of  Faraday,  Thomson and Lord Kelvin 
Bergson  writes   that   the  difference  between  object   and   force   is  progressively  being 
abandoned:
We see force more and more materialized, the atom more and more idealized, 
the   two   terms   converging   toward   a   common   limit   and   the   universe   thus 
recovering   its   continuity.   ...   [T]hey   show   us,   pervading   concrete   extensity, 































The   extended   can   no   longer   be   understood   as   composed   of   unchanging 
corpuscles.   The   unextended,   in   its   stead,   can   no   longer   be   understood   as   some 














what   appears   as   purely   homogeneous  movement   in   space?   Only   one   hypothesis 
remains,   claims  Bergson   in   the   very   final   pages   of   the   book:   concrete  movement 




means,   it   is  or  has  a   temporal  unity  and  not  a   series  of  discrete  points   in   space. 
Movement has "memory" or "consciousness", not merely in the sense that they are all of 















15 There is something distinctly odd about the way Bergson juxtaposes in this example an element 
of scientific knowledge, a seemingly unmediated realist claim about the world, with the lived 
experience of the same. As though his analysis here, one that critiques the idea that movement is 
composed of parts, does not apply to colour and its vibrations. As though single vibrations  do 
exist, whereas the separate positions of a mobile do not. 
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In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it  is possible to imagine many 























claims   self­subsisting,   irreducible,   unchanging,   distinct   and   identical   bodies. 
Mechanicism   claims   that   change   in   the   system   ("surface­change")   consists   of   a 
reconfiguration  of  particles.  The   reconfiguration   is  purely   spatial   and   the  particles  
themselves   preserve   identity   throughout   this   reconfiguration.   And   it   would   entail 
determinism.   Cause   and   effect   entertain   a   purely   unilateral   relation.   The   cause 
influences the effect and never the other way around. Furthermore, the effect must be 
understood   to  exist   in   some pre­formed state  within   the  cause.  The cause   itself   is 
equally the effect of a preceding cause. 
All   three   claims  Bergson  has  undermined.  Bodies   cannot  be   separated   from 
qualitative change, nor do they exist   in  isolation from the total  system; rather,  any 









To   reply,   to  an  action  received,  by  an  immediate   reaction which  adopts   the 
rhythm of the first and which continues it in the same duration, to be in the 










perception already partakes  of  memory.  Because existence  is  of   the  temporal  order 
every   action   reverberates   throughout   the   system.   Such   action,   or   movement,   is 





























Memory   is  a  progressive  work of   re­organisation  that   contains  within   itself  myriad 
degrees of contraction. The degree of integration of influences signals the degree in 
which an organism has a past. It is in having a living past that an organism is free. As 
Deleuze   comments:   "More  past  =  more   future,   and   thus   freedom".17  Bergson   thus 
concludes:
The greater or lesser tension of their duration, which expresses, at bottom, their 
greater   or   lesser   intensity   of   life,   thus   determines   both   the   degree   of   the 
16 An contemporary account that is not inspired by the work of Bergson but one that ends up 
remarkably close to this understanding of the material body as composed of so many relatively 
closed circuits of action is found in the work of Varela and Maturna. See e.g., H.R. Maturna and 
F.J. Varela The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, (Boston and 
London: Shambala, 1992), revised edition. 













we now take duration as   first  reality,   if  we assume a mobile  continuity  then what 








Life,  Bergson wrote,  effects  a  primary  discontinuity  between needs  and what 
serves   to   satisfy   them.   From   a  wholly   disinterested   perspective,   that   is,   from   the 
perspective of immediate intuition, there is only continuity and indivisible movement. 
From a practical perspective, however, a perspective oriented by needs, a discontinuity 






all   line up on a single plane. The present  is what  interests me, what  is  actual and 
summons me to act, whereas the past consists of all those actions that are no longer of 
interest and no longer actual (MM, 280 / 137). That which interests me is dependent 



























1 See the discussion on the sequence of number in  Time and Free Will: "On the one hand we 
assume that [numbers] are identical, which is conceivable only on condition that these units are 
ranged alongside each other in a homogeneous medium; but on the other hand the third unit, for 
example, when added to the other two, alters the nature, the appearance and, as it were, the 
rhythm of the whole; without this interpenetration and this, so to speak, qualitative progress, no 
addition would be possible. Hence it is through the quality of quantity that we form the idea of 
quantity without quality." (DI 82 / 123, emp. added). See also R. Breeur, “Bergson and Sartre's 
Account of the Self in Relation to the Transcendental Ego,” International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 9, no. 2 (2001), 182-3.
2 Interestingly  Russell,  in  his  discussion  of  the  Zeno  paradoxes,  refers  to  Bergson.  Although 
commonly thought to differ, his views in fact do not seem to be in direct conflict with Bergson's.  
Russell shows that infinity cannot be attained through a process of addition. Infinity lies outside 
of any set,  more so,  it  cannot be part  of  any set.  He compares infinity  with the activity  of 
abstracting from a given set to attain a certain quality of that set. Hence we may conclude that 
Russell sees infinity as a different process and of a different order than the numerical. See "The 
Problem of Infinity Historically Considered", 187 esp., in idem,  Our Knowledge of the External  











be   reliably  predicted.  However,  and as  Hume had already  forcefully  demonstrated, 
nothing prevents the future from differing from our predictions.3 But because we tacitly 




future   is  not   and   cannot  already  be  here  because   the  present   is   "that  part  of  my 
duration which is in process of growth (loc. cit.). The possible is a form of pseudo­
existence, preformed and ready to go, only waiting for the limitation on actual existence 




3 See "Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion" in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978).
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1.2 Materiality and freedom
Materiality   is   related   to  action and  the  present.  This  materiality,  as  we have   seen, 
allows for degrees. Our present includes all that is actual for us. We may well imagine 
that the present is less extensive for a fruit fly just as we may imagine beings for whom 
our  present   appears   as   rather   limited.   It   is   in   this   sense   that  Bergson  writes   that 
duration allows us "to affirm the existence of objects inferior and superior (though in a 
certain sense interior) to us" (IM, 1416 / 33). Not only are there inferior and superior 
durations,  but   these  are  interior  to  me,  as   I  am  interior   to   them.  There  are  daily, 
monthly   and   yearly   cycles  within  me,   just   as   I   partake   in   even   longer   cycles   of 
generational and species­life "outside" of me. As Bergson tried to explain through the 














by   choosing  unequivocally   for   the   reality   and   indivisibility   of  movement.  The   two 















we   experience   a   world   of   semi­permanent   bodies   moving   against   a   relatively 
unchanging background. To explain how such a world of bodies appears, all Bergson 






















The two problems of the limited nature of  life and of  life's  individuation are 
related to a third problem that appears with Matter and Memory. Of the original two 
forms of organisation, we are now left with just one. As Worms notes, "[i]n becoming a 
4 Canguilhem  calls  life's  limited  force  one  of  the  "secretly  important  presuppositions"  of 
Bergsonism.  See  Georges  Canguilhem,  “Commentaire  au  troisième  chapitre  de  L'Évolution 
créatrice,” Annales bergsonienne 3, no. Bergson et la science (2007), 124. Original in Bulletin de 








allows for  these degrees,  as memory  is  essentially  duration.  But   if  space  is  a  mere 
abstraction   then   this   creates   the   problem  of   how   to  understand   the   possibility   of 













5 Worms 2004, 165.
6 Philip Soulez and Frédéric Worms Bergson, Biographie (Flammerion, 1997), 45.






















8 Death is mentioned at EC, 704n, 725 / 158n, 173, furthermore in the section "Individuality and 
Age", esp. 12. To my knowledge it has not received a great deal of attention in the literature. I 
would  like  to  extend my  gratitude  to  the  organisers,  speakers  and participants  of  the  very 
interesting conference "Au-delà de la philosophie de la vie. Ateliers sur Les deux sources de la 
morale et de la religion" held at the University of Tokyo on the 18th of October 2007 (organised 
by Centre for Death and Life Studies, Susumu Shimazono (dir.)) where the question of relation of 
Bergson's thought to death came up on a number of occasions. 
9 Jean  Hyppolite  "Du  Bergsonisme  à  l'existentialisme"  in  Figures  de  la  pensée  philosophique 
(Paris: PUF, 1971), 448
10 Op. cit., 453.
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grace of God. Where Bergson believes in the transcendence of the human condition, 
existentialism   feels   itself   "impuissant",   other   than   through   faith,   to   transcend   this 
condition.  Because   faith  cannot  be  philosophically   justified,  existentialism signals  a 
profound crisis of philosophy.11 Hyppolite wrote this after the Second World War, a war 
of  which  Bergson   saw  the  beginnings  but  not   the  end   (Bergson  died   in  1941).  A 
number of key commentators that we will discuss in this chapter wrote during the war. 
















11 Op. cit., 458.
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are  only  differences  of  degree  in  nature   ­  degrees  of   complexity   in   the   first 
hypothesis, of intensity in the second (op. cit., 656 / 122­3)
The accidental meeting of the two is not really that arbitrary because we know that in 
his   younger   years   Bergson  was   an   enthusiastic   follower   of   Spencer's   evolutionary 
determinism.12  But   he   soon  parted  ways.  Bergson  writes   towards   the   very   end  of 
Creative   Evolution:  "the   usual   device   of   the   Spencerian   method   consists   in 














12 See Jean de la Harpe, 1943, 358-9. 
Spencer  (1820-1903)  coined  the  phrase  "survival  of  the  fittest"  and  championed  the  value  of 
individual competition. Key works:  Principles of Ethics, Principles of Biology  and  Principles of 
Sociology.
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from  the  organised   to   the   unorganised   through   a   simple  difference   in   degree.  As 







13 On interruption see also EC, 666, 672, 681, 682, 696, 703 / 129, 134, 140, 141, 152, 157.
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behave which, left to itself, would  work in the inverse direction. Incapable of 










that  we  find  the   footnote  on death  alluded  to  previously.   In   this   footnote  Bergson 
disputes the idea that everything tends towards death. Matter is a descent into inertia 
and stasis and life is incapable of stopping. What it can do is delay it.14 







14 In that footnote Bergson goes on to suggest that perhaps life wills death, see op. cit., 158n.




















external   sense:   it   is   something   that   causes   the   interruption  of   something   else;   an 
interrupted   ship's   voyage  means   it   has   stopped  moving.   Inversion   seems   to   imply 
monism and interruption dualism. The two then cannot simply be equated, yet this is  
precisely what Bergson intends to show: that inversion means interruption:
16 See Milič Čapek ‘Bergson’s theory of the mind-brain relation’ in  Bergson and modern thought 
(Harwood: Chur, 1987), A.C. Papanicolau and P.A.Y. Gunter eds, 132.
17 Mullarkey 1999, 55.
18 On memory in EC see 498-9, 508 / 3-4, 11.
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19 See also EC 672-3, 681, 683, 696, 703 / 134-5, 140, 143, 152, 157-8, where Bergson repeatedly 
uses the two in a single sentence without clear distinction.
20 Jankélévitch, 1999, 175.
21 De la Harpe, 1943, 360.


















spiritual   is  not   immaterial  and  the material   is  not  a­spiritual.  Rather,  both exist  as 
tendencies and not as separate worlds. 
The question of monism and dualism first came up in an article from 1912 by 
Rev. Joseph de Tonquédec titled  'M. Bergson,  est­il  moniste?'23  De Tonquédec asked 
whether there is a place in the philosophy of Bergson for God as a reality distinct from 
23 Partially reprinted in the supplements to the  L'évolution créatrice,  edition  "Le choc Bergson" 
(Paris: PUF, 2008), F. Worms (ed.), 618-33. Original in Études par des Pères de la compagnie de 
Jésus, t. CXXX, no 1, 1912, 506-16.
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that  of   the world.  To this  de Tonquédec answers   in the negative:   "Nowhere do we 
perceive a creative act as heterogeneous to what it creates".24 Because, according to De 
Tonquédoc,  Bergson denies   this  distinction,  he writes   that  Bergsonism is  a   form of 
monism.25  Interestingly Bergson did not agree and responded that a free and creative 
God was rather a consequence from Creative Evolution: God may be seen as that out of 












there  are  different  kinds  of   causes  at  work  in   the  organised and  the  unorganised, 
working in diverging directions. On the one hand, there is the interminable degradation 
of "downward" material changes; on the other hand, there is true creation of the forms 
24 Op. cit., 627.
25 Op. cit., 620.
26 In a private letter to De Tonquédec, in op. cit., 632. Also reproduced in M, 964. Note that this 
exchange  took  place  prior  to  Bergson's  later  adhesion  to  Catholicism.  Although  he  never 
converted because as he said in the last years of the life and leading up to the Second World War, 
he wanted to "stay among the persecuted", he did ask for a Catholic priest to pray at his funeral. 
See Soulez and Worms, 1997, 227.












univocity,  of   existence.  From his  Doctoral  Thesis  onwards  Bergson  has   consistently 
stressed that conscious phenomena, and this includes life, have a form of organisation 
different   from   that   claimed   to   exist   in   a   deterministic   system.  There   is   a   rupture 
between the organised and the unorganised and as long as we do not see this as a  
qualitative   difference  we  will   inadvertently   conceive   of   it   as   a  mere   difference   of 















unique  de   jure.   Life   as   duration   is   an  ascent  to   ever   higher   integration   and 
concentration.




that  are   invisible  and homogeneous,  and  that   the   instability   to  which  we owe  the 
richness and variety of the changes taking place in our solar system will gradually give 
way   to   the   relative   stability   of   elementary   vibrations   continually   and   perpetually 





28 On ascent  and descent  see also  Sylvain Roux,  “L'ambiguïté  néoplatonicienne:  Bergson et  la 
philosophie  grecque  dans  L'Évolution  créatrice”  Conference  paper,  2007,  available  via 











continually  threatened to be  unmade  by matter.  Because  life needs matter,   life  is  a 
limited  force   (e.g.,  504,  602,   618,  621­2  /   8,  82,  92,   96,  97).  Because   the   living 
organism  is   the   result   of   a   tendency   towards   spirituality   and   a   tendency   towards 
materiality Bergson writes:





















As  an  unmaking  the   living  organism  is  no  different   from matter,  with   its  entropic 
tendencies. But clearly it  is not as an  unmaking  that the organised differs from the 








29 As Philip Soulez relates,  according to J.L.  Vieillard-Baron, Bergson is one of the few French 
philosophers who uses "destination" in a strong sense and suggests this might well be linked to  
the lecture course on Fichte's The Vocation of Man. Mentioned by Philip Soulez (without citing 

























a theory of   life and a theory of knowledge  is   in many ways similar to the Kantian 
distinction   between   everyday   empirical   understanding   and   philosophical 
understanding: "A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is  








is   not   only   interested   in   justification   ("how   the   frames   of   knowledge   have   been 
constructed") but he also wants  to  extend  the  frames of knowledge. Such extended 
thought would be more appropriate to life as duration. What Bergson wants to show is 





Deleuze,   in  his   lecture course on Chapter   III  of  Creative  Evolution,   says   that 
whereas Kant had wanted, though more implicitly than explicitly, to trace the genesis of  
30 Here we see the profound modification of Kantianism towards a pragmatism that took place in 










Hence  we  may  see  Bergson's  embeddedness   in   the  post­Kantian  completion  of   the 
Kantian system. Matter and intellect, or consciousness and the thing in itself, should not 
be seen as two ready­made schemata but as engaged in a co­determining, or reciprocal 
genesis.   Although   Fichte   lacks   Bergson's   temporal   understanding,   his   emphasis   on 
reciprocal determination of the I and not­I, and of activity and passivity, clearly has laid 
much of the ground­work for this later move by Bergson.
Bergson   appreciates   the   fact   that   Kant's   Transcendental   Aesthetic   had 
demonstrated that extension is not a material attribute like other attributes, such as 
heat and colour. Rather, it is an a priori form of perception, because our mind, without 






these   two   supposed   to   fit?   It   seems   there   are   but   three   options:   either   the   thing 
31 Deleuze, 2007, 77-8.




as   given   but   allowed   for  degrees   of   spatiality   (loc.   cit.)?   If   the   abstract   space   of 
















33 We see how this idea of there being degrees of spatiality mirrors Fichte's solution to the problem 
of the thing in itself.  For Fichte, the thing in itself, and the determination by thinking are two 
poles that range from activity to passivity. The introduction of degrees between I and not-I is 
precisely intended to show their continuity and to prove epistemic monism. Epistemic monism 
would claim that I am always already engaged with the world and so no form of knowledge exists  
of the world outside of any relation to me. Philosophy is not another kind of knowledge with its  
own separate domain in reality, but it is an internal reflection on knowledge. Bergson does not 
always  seem  to  agree  with  Fichte  on  this  point,  since  he  is  also  commited  to  immediate 
experience.  Yet  for  Bergson  too,  knowledge  is  a  form  of  action.  Bergson  too  would  deny 
knowledge or experience of  the word as it  is,  outside of  any relation to me. His immediate 



















Consciousness  and matter  appear   to  us,   then,  as   radically  different   forms of 
existence, even as antagonistic forms, which have to find a  modus vivendi  (op. 
cit., 824 / 13).
34 In  The Two Sources  Bergson will speak of the vital need for a  fonction fabulatrice. See  Jean-
Christophe Goddard, “L'image de l'élan vital dans le chapitre II des Deux sources de la morale et  





















35 Jankélévitch, 1999, 169, 177. The first edition of this work appeared in 1931.
36 Op. cit.,  168
37 Loc. cit.
38 Op. cit., 170
39 Ibid.









But,   Jankélévitch   notes,   Bergson   also   affirms  monism,   and   this   question   of 











is   an   "anti­vital"   tendency,   that   "goes  against",   "reverses",   or   "resists",   the  effort  of  
41 Op. cit., 172.
42 Jankélévitch 1999, 171: rétricer, préciser, canaliser.
43 Op. cit.,  173
44 Canguilhem, 2007, 150.














each book  in  forgetting the others.  Canguilhem quotes   from "Introduction:  Part   II", 
where Bergson writes that, because each problem demanded a unique effort, the theory 
of body and soul as presented in  Matter and Memory  could not have been extracted 




48 Op. cit.,  175.
49 Not long after this lecture, in 1943, the Gestapo occupies the university. Canguilhem quits his 
post and joins the maquis, the resistance movement in the south of France. See Giuseppe Bianco, 
“Présentation du "commentaire" de Georges Canguilhem,” Annales bergsonienne 3, no. Bergson 
et la science (2007), 100.
50 Canguilhem, 2007, 139. CM 1329-30 / 89-90.
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If, therefore, it is impossible to reduce the matter of  Creative Evolution  to the 
matter   of  Matter   and  Memory  it   is   in   the   relation  between  matter   and   the 
evolution of life that we must search for its reason. In Matter and Memory  it is 
the   relation  between   the  matter  of   the  individually  organised  body  and   the 
individual  consciousness that is studied. In  Creative Evolution  it is the relation 







and  of  necessity  and   freedom.  These   two  accounts   in  Matter  and  Memory  are  not 




lack?  Nor  did   the   second   account  help   answer   this  question.  Different   degrees   of 
contraction may be said to give us general conditions for individuation, but not specific, 
and certainly not vital conditions for individuation. 
We   have   seen   that   this   is   what  Creative   Evolution  set   out   to   demonstrate. 




51 Loc. cit., emp. added.
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Matter  and Memory  and  Creative  Evolution  lies  not  between conflicting  accounts  of 
reality. Rather, the problem in Creative Evolution is how to unify two accounts of body 






52 If time would have allowed I would have wanted to discuss in much greater detail how precisely 
Bergson understands individuation as I think that here a wealth of  sources can be found to 
complement Fichte's philosophy, one that in many ways lacks a temporal and vital perspective. It 
is therefore unfortunate that this cannot be attempted here.





























and   Fichte   knew,   the   essence   lies   neither   in   a   pure   intuition,   nor   it   conceptual  
explication but in a going backwards and forwards between them.54
5. Action and contemplation, interruption and inversion
In   distinguishing   between   two   aspects   of   reality   and   two  modes   of   knowing   and 








knowledge   and  philosophical   reflection.  Where  knowledge   concerns  that  which  we 
know,  philosophy after Kant asks,  how  is  this knowledge possible? It  asks after  the 
conditions   for   the   intelligibility   of   knowledge.   This   question   cannot   be   asked   by 
empirical knowledge itself as this would only result in a description, or enumeration, of 
various ideas, and not a thinking it through. It would not give us  a priori  conditions. 
54 Compare the notion of Schweben the account given in IM 1419 / 37.
55 Please note the error in the English translation, which has "fictitious problems" for "problèmes 
factices" as F.C.T. Moore points out in his Bergson: Thinking Backwards (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1996), 21.
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Bergson,  writing at the start  of  the 20th Century, makes essentially  the same point 
when he writes that we are doomed to repeat the contingencies of human culture and 





the   "ready­made   garments"   with  which  we   usually   approach   the   phenomenon   of 




xxxviii­xxxix).   And   the   fourth   chapter   finally   prepares   for   a   philosophy   that  will 
transcend the self­imposed limitations of thought. 
In all his works there are certain misunderstandings that Bergson never fails to 
criticise.  All   these misunderstandings in  fact share the same root,  which lies  in not 
properly   distinguishing   between   the   practical   perspective   and   the   contemplative 
perspective.  Thus  arise   the  confused  ideas  of   the  primacy  of   the  possible  over   the 
virtual, of the trajectory over movement, of disorder over order, the complex over the 



























practical   thought   in  order   to   think anew.56  To  think against  our  habitual  modes  of 
thought requires effort, a violent effort even, one that cannot be sustained for long. We 















there can be something (it   first  needs to be created),  all   the analyses  of  conscious 
phenomena and life show the undeniable and irreducible positivity or spontaneity of 
these  phenomena.  But   this  precisely  we  cannot   see   from  the  practical  perspective. 
Hence   a   (methodical)   effort   is   required   and  a  going  against   the  normal  habits  of 
56 The first development this idea is found in the article "Intellectual Effort", written in 1902. In ES.
57 Note the similarities with Fichte's question of the existence of the I before consciousness, see 




























When   ‘life’   dissociates   in   its   collision  with  matter,   there   is   here   a  meeting 


















59  J. Mullarkey Bergson and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 82.
60 All from  op. cit., 82.
61 Op. cit., 81.




the  “actual,  new present  [is   seen]  to  be  ontologically  prefigured within   the  virtual, 
persisting past”, this would be to make the actual “ontologically redundant”.63 Although 
Deleuze,   according   to   Mullarkey,   seems   to   understand   the   virtual­actual   as   an 
ontological  distinction,   this cannot but  conflict  with Deleuze’s  commitment to what 
















63 J. Mullarkey Post-Continental Philosophy,  (London: Continuum, 2006), 27.
64 Op. cit., 24.











Mullarkey,   in  Bergson   and   Philosophy,   proposes   we   introduce   a   distinction 








various   aspects   of   this   reality   are   sometimes   better   accounted   for   within   one 
perspective,  and sometimes within  the another.  Mullarkey comes close to  this  view 
when in Post­Continental Philosophy he writes that we should see the virtual­actual, not 
as   something   “ontologically   foundational”,  but   rather  as   something   “pragmatic  and 
processual.”71  Hence   he   writes   that   we   need   to   distinguish   between   different 
67 Mullarkey, 1999, 80.
68 Op. cit., 82 and 81 respectively.
69 Op. cit., 64.
70 Op. cit., 83.
















In   this   thesis   I   have   formulated   the  debate   on  different   approaches   as   one 
between determinists and advocates of freedom. And as should be more or less clear by 
now, this not only concerns the different accounts as such, but also the consideration of 
what   these   accounts   are   supposed   to   be   doing   and   what   their   strengths   and 
shortcomings are. This in many ways is what I see as the motivation behind Kant’s  









































amoralism",  considering   the   circumstances   in  which   it  was  written   certainly  not   a 
empty comment.76 Although Life is the only court of appeal, Life does not speak to us 
directly, but only ever through us. Because the only sense we can make of things is the 
sense   that  we  make,   we  must   express   Life   through   Spirit   and   Value.   It  must   be 
expressed through both Spirit and Value if we do not want our lives reduced to life's 
basest instincts. A philosophy of life is thus bound to a "hybrid couple" of Force and 
Value,   Life   and  Spirit.77  It   is  a  hybrid   couple  because  Value  and  Spirit   are  always 
secondary to Life, yet Life cannot do without Value and Spirit.
73 Hans  Urs  von  Balthasar,  “La  philosophie  de  la  vie  chez  Bergson  et  chez  les  allemands 
modernes,”  in  Henri  Bergson.  Essais  et  témoignages  recueillis (Neuchatel:  Éditions  de  la 
Baconnière, 1943), 264-270.  It is the only entry by von Balthasar found in P.A.Y. Gunter,  Henri 
Bergson: A Bibliography (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1986).
74 As quoted in op. cit., 266.
75 E.g., PM 1329-0 / 89-90
76 von Balthasar, op. cit., 267.
77 Op. cit., 268.
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The   ambiguous   relation   of   Life   and   Value   that   one   finds   in   the   German 
philosophers   of   life,   one   also   finds   in   Jewish   philosopher   Bergson,   writes   von 
Balthasar.78 We find in Bergson two diametrically opposed systems.79 The first one has 
as its centre the intensity of duration and creation. It is only at its periphery that we 








opposition   becomes   more   clear,   writes   von   Balthasar.   The   first   system   sees   true 
authentic action residing in the effort of the creative mind. Here the practical is merely 
"an indirect and distant reflection" of it.81 It is Life that is true reality and Form; Value 





78 Think here also of what Bergson wrote to the French Fichte expert Xavier Léon: "It are often our 
own ideas, systematised and pushed to their final consequences that we look for in Germany." 
See 'Bergson à X. Léon, 5 Dec. 1914 in Henri Bergson, Correspondances, 604. Please also note 
again the date of the exchange: December 5th, 1914, just months after the declaration of war 
between Germany and France. 
79 von Balthasar, op. cit., 268-70.
80 See e.g. the article "Dreams" from 1901, in ES.






the   action­as­effort   of   the   first   system   displays   a   hostility   against   the   "geometric 
rationality"   that   "empties"   life   of   its   intelligible   and   teleological   structures.83  The 
confusion   of   duration   with   space   reduces   life   and   creativity   to   mechanism   and 
determinism. The second system, action­as­present­totality, displays a hostility against 
"pure spirit" that impedes the full immersion in the Whole of life and action. These two 













84 Op. cit., 270.
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From the point of view of resentment there is a:
­ (contemplation) hostility   against   geometric   rationality   that   makes   life  
unintelligible
­ (action) hostility against pure spirit that impedes immersion in Life
Although   there   is  much   that   is  profound   in  what   von  Balthasar  writes,  and 
















against  habit,  would,   on   von   Balthasar's   account,   be   hostile   against   the   confused 
85 A confusion I will readily admit to be my own, rather than imputing it to von Balthasar when this 
will be shown.
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geometric   rationality   that  makes   life  unintelligible,   and   that   this   is   the   attitude  of 






The creative mind,  on  the contrary,   sees  or  knows nothing of   the continuity of  all  
action, it only sees obstacles and habits. Yet, in unmaking what was made and making 
it into something new it is profoundly one with life. But creating does not mean taking 





to   desire   the   Truth   of   Life   as   One,   Immobile,   Unchanging   and   Transparent.   The 
practical attitude, now as a  form of understanding,  and  aimed at Oneness with Life, 
desires the end of Life, the Nothing or nihilism.
Where   the   philosopher's  mind,   in   contemplating   life,   is   detached   from   the 
creative  élan  of life, it wants to  immerse  itself in life, because it feels alienated from 
creative life. It thus reacts against itself, against the "pure spirit" that impedes its own 
immersion. Being contemplation it desires action.  The creative mind, being action but 
not yet  Spirit,  wants  to  understand  Life,  but   finds  itself  unable to contemplate Life 
296
without mixing in its practical attitude. It creates for itself the geometric rationality that 









the  absolute".  Problems   start  when what   is  useful   to  action  is   transposed  into   the 
domain of contemplation. It is here that philosophy must try to separate the two. What 
complicates   matters   is   that   the   distinction   between   action   and   contemplation   is 
unequal. Often it is said to be one between practical and theoretical knowledge, but 
this is in fact misleading. 












































Fichte   and   Bergson   this   view   should   be   rejected.   Philosophical   grounds   are   not 





































































are   responsible   for   our   knowledge.   Knowledge   does   not   come   to   us   in   purely 
deterministic   fashion,   but   is   an   act   of   spontaneity   of   consciousness.   Against   both 




empirical   senses   and   their   miraculous   reproduction   in   consciousness   (radical 
empiricism). 














claim   to   sure   and   certain   knowledge,   or  Wissenschaft,  and  what  merely   poses   as 
knowledge, mere “enthusiasm” or Schwärmerei (KrV A xi­xii).
This   story   is  well­known but   still  warrants   repeating  because  it  permanently 
changed the very nature of philosophy itself. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 
shock­waves it sent running through philosophy are still resounding today. Kant denies 












ultimate   world   or   ultimate   form   of   knowledge.   But   what   does   this   mean   for 
philosophy?  Although   the   answer   to   this  question   is   already   contained  within   the 
above, it will be Fichte who will make it explicit.
1.2 Fichte























want   of   a   better   name,   or   to   reconnect   critical   philosophy  with   the   tradition   of 
philosophy, Fichte appeals   to  intellectual  or philosophical   intuition.  Although Fichte 
does   not   always   clearly   disambiguate   between   the   attentiveness   to   the   process   of 









describing  how people   think   ("psychologism"),  or  of   enumerating  all   the  claims   to 
knowledge. The argument is not an empirical argument but rather a determination of 















and  certain  knowledge,   knowledge  as   science,  or  Wissenschaft,  which   is   the  active 
process of  creating (schaffen)  knowledge.  Philosophy aims  to   instruct people  in  the 

















philosophy,  properly  understood,  does  not   subscribe   to  a   two­world   theory.  Rather, 
there is a difference of approach, or of  interest; a difference between a reflective stance  
and a practical one, which should not be conflated with claims of different existing 
worlds   (phenomenal  world  versus  noumenal  world).  That  Barthélemy­Madaule   too 
understands Kant in Platonic fashion makes her discussion of Bergson’s relation to Kant 
of limited value for our purposes. Although she is aware of the fact that “what Bergson 
1 Viellard-Baron, 1997a, 96.
2 See Françoise Fabre Luce de Gruson “Bergson, lecteur de Kant.” Les Études Bergsoniennes 5: 
1960,  179n.  We have discussed Bergson’s relation to Kant in the following sections:  Ch. IV: 
Sections: 4; 4.1; 5; 6; Ch. V: Sections: 1.1; 1.2; 2.1; 2.4; 3; 4; Ch. VI Sections 3.3; 4; 5.
3 See op. cit. Madeleine Barthélemy-Madaule remarks that we do not really know to what extent 
Bergson read Kant or the neo-Kantians such as Renouvier. See  idem. Bergson, adversaire de 
Kant (Paris: P.U.F., 1966), 4.
4 ibid.














temporal  order  and although  the   syntheses  of  knowledge are   rooted  in   reality,  we 
should not confuse the concepts that result from the process of knowledge with an 
understanding of the process of thought itself.  For Bergson the Kantian relativity of 
knowledge   only   applies   to   experience   under   its   utilitarian   aspect.   The   Kantian 
structures  are  only  so  many  habitual  ways  of   interacting  with   the  world,  a  world, 
furthermore, that lends itself to the ready­made. These structures are neither relative, as 
Bergson thinks he can show  contra  Kant,  nor are we  for  ever  bound  to   them.  The 
relativity  of  knowledge  is  denied   twice  over.  Reality   itself   is  partly   composed of  a 
tendency towards thing­like beings, towards habits,  towards individuation. Scientific 
knowledge  “touches  the absolute”  because  it  arises   in  “dual  genesis”  with  the very 
materiality of the world. Hence the adequacy of scientific knowledge is guaranteed. But 
crucially for Bergson this does not limit us to it. Because such knowledge is composed 
6 Op. cit., 4-5, see also 83, 84.
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but  because  both are not  carved  in  stone but  are  the result  of   self­legislation,  our 
understanding of   the conditions of  knowledge  is  equally conditioned by knowledge 










Some  would   fear   that   the   fact   that   philosophy   has   a   history  would   be   to 
condemn   philosophy   to   mere   historicism.  What   is   the   idea   of   history   that   they 
entertain? Are historical phenomena mere facts? Would the history of philosophy then 
be a mere description of a contingent sequence of historical arguments? No, the history 
















almost  inadvertently fall  prey to what Bergson called the retroactivity of truth.8  We 
select and interpret the past in light of the present. The past helps us understand our 
present and this actualises the past in the present. The illusion consists of reading into 
7 Philonenko, 1990a, 26.












that  are   inevitably  contained  in   that   solution  to  become visible.  The measure  of  a 
philosophy then should not merely lie in its capacity to deal with a given problem, but 










became   thinkable  with   them   then   to   demand   of   them   to   take   this   problem   into 
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Kant  had  tried  to  make explicit   the rules   that  govern our knowledge of   the 
world. Abidance to these rules guaranteed the fidelity of knowledge. Who did not want 















and that spontaneity of  consciousness,  understood as  duration,  describes  the actual 
state of reality. For Fichte knowledge explicitly becomes a kind of activity. Man is self­
legislating;   he   constructs   and   abides   by   his   own   rules.   Hence   something   like 
pragmatism can now easily be situated within the history of transcendental philosophy. 
Although  pragmatism  only   seems   to   take   the   epistemological   aspect   on  board,   its 
critique of Kant’s universal and a priori rules, and its advocacy of historically contingent 
ones, is only first conceivable on the basis of Fichte’s reformulation. The other aspect, 
reality   as   spontaneous  process,   can  be   seen   as   being   taken   up   by,   among  others, 
evolutionism. If life is self­regulating then the organism both has to maintain certain 












that   this  praxis   is  only  one  of  two  tendencies  of   reality  (the  other  being  of  course 












different   from   Newtonianism   must   be   seen   as   having   been   prepared   by   Kant’s 



















that   neo­Kantianism   had   to   offer.   By   failing   to   interpret   Kant   as   a   historical­
philosophical moment that requires constant interpretation, and instead presenting him 
as someone who brought the tables down from the mountain, a more radical move was 
now   required.   Against   Spencerian   deterministic   evolutionism   and   a   static 












it  was   the  aim of   this   thesis   to  determine   to  what  extent  an  alternative  could  be 
formulated that would be both superior to, and relatively independent of, determinism.





























consciousness   only   ever   appears   with   object­consciousness.   Although   Kant 
distinguished   between   empirical   self­consciousness   and   transcendental   self­
9 We would have to show those for at least the phenomena, as clearly an account that would also 
include  the  metaphysics  of  determinism would  not  be possible  as  this  metaphysics  itself  is  




determining   an   object   had   not   been   made   explicit.   For   Kant   empirical   self­









determination   with   a   "not­I".   The   distinction   is   no   longer   between   an   already 
constituted   subject   and   an  opposite   and   external   object,   rather,   it   is   a   distinction 
between determining and determinate being, between an active pole  and a passive 









with   Fichte.   Empirical   knowledge,   or   awareness   of   self,   is   thus   in   reciprocal 
determination  with  what   is  not­self.  Hence  Fichte  has  no  need   to  appeal   to   some 
privileged   rational   psychology   that   has  miraculous   non­empirical   intuitions   of   the 
empirical self.
The   second   sense   of   self   (the   transcendental   self)   also   relates   to   the 
determination   of   objects.   Kant   considered   non­empirical   consciousness   of   the 
transcendental   I   an   absurdity.   Now,   in   a   way,   Fichte   does   not   disagree.   If   the 
transcendental   I   is   the  act  of   determining   an   object   then   it   is   only  with,  in,  or 
contemporaneous  to,   the empirical,  actual,  act of determining an object that  I  may 
become aware  of   the  act  of  determination,   that   is,  of   the   transcendental   I.  Hence 
transcendental   self­consciousness   is   related   to   the   actual   occurrence   of   the   act   of 
determining an object,  hence it  requires such an object. Pure apperception is  not a 
representational   recognition   of   myself   as   identical   with   myself;   it   entails   no 
comparison, but an awareness of, or reflection on, what I do all the time. Thought can 
take   itself   as   object,   precisely   because   it   is   not   an   object,   but   the   activity   of  
determination.   Determination   does   not   come   about   mechanically   but   must   be 
understood   as   occurring   spontaneously   and   for   Fichte   this  meant   it   is   conscious 
immediately.   Such   immediate   consciousness   can   become   explicit   self­consciousness 
(recognition of oneself as the subject of thought) when it turns its activity on itself to 
determine   what   this   activity   is.   This,   however,   is   not   a   constitutive   act,   just   as 





























From the philosophical  perspective of   "pure  intuition" materiality   is  merely a  lower 
degree   of   the   continuous   organisational   effort   that   is   duration.   This   allows   us   to 
understand   general   conditions   of   individuation,   but   not  vital  ones.   Although   the 



























However,   concerning   the   first  of   the   two  points,   the   relative  permanence  of 
bodies,   Bergson,   to  my  mind   at   least,  was   right   to   claim   that   duration,   far   from 
eliminating   substance,   has   facilitated   our   understanding   of   it.   A   mechanistic­
deterministic account of matter is unable to give an adequate account of persistence 
through time because  it  always reduces time to space.  Duration  lets us understand 
matter  as  a  constant   integrative effort,  different  only  in tending  towards a  relative 
closure of action­reaction, towards a relative repetition and towards being relatively 
local, rather than global. Without such an account we would have matter constantly 








11 See Maritain "Preface to the Second Edition" (1932) in Maritain 2007, 29.
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less strong our position is vis à vis determinism. A transcendent principle would merely 











Philosophy then only needs to  unwind this principle   to  return to  our habitual,  not 
critically investigated, assumptions. Such a principle is merely the concept of concepts, 
a concept so general it would not matter whether there be plants, animals and man. 
Here   the   I  would  only  amount   to  mere   indexicality   and   in  no   sense  would   it   be 
embodied. Such a philosophy would not be very original.
When   one   reads   Fichte   it   is   not   hard   to   see   how   one   could   come   to   this  
judgment. Fichte's explicit ambition was to provide a genetic account of the categories 
of thought as presented by Kant. Hence quality and quantity, limitation, relation, all  
12 Published in 1934 in PM. This coincides with the publication in 1922 of Xavier Léon's Fichte et 






made   after   Fichte's   rethinking  of  Kant's   philosophy.   It   is   a   retro­active   illusion  on 
Bergson's part to demand such an effort from Fichte. Fichte gave an account of the 
necessary interrelation of the "absolute principle" of self­positing on the one hand, and 
reciprocal   determination   of   the   I   and   not­I   on   the   other.   A   vital,   durational   and 
evolutionary account of embodiment first became possible on the basis of this genetic 
account.   If  Bergson  is  able   to  give a  much more nuanced account  of  embodiment, 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A   first   step   to   the   solution   Fichte   finds   in   Kant’s   appeal   to   a   original   and 
synthetic   act   of   consciousness,   something   said   to   be   a   necessary   transcendental 
condition of experience. We situate this appeal to something both original and synthetic 
as motivated by the perceived failure of a radically reductivist empiricist project (i.e.,  




not­I  are  co­genetic   in   that   they must  be   seen  to  stand  in  a   relation of   reciprocal 










sustained  account  of  how  to   think   relationally.   They  prioritise   the   question  of   the 
Verhältnis  (dynamic   relation,   reciprocity)   of   subject   and   object   as   something   that 
precedes the question of the Beziehung (directed relation, intentionality) of subject and 
object.   The   second   question   already   assumes   subject   and   object   and   is   therefore 
dependent on the first. For Fichte and Bergson to understand subject and object means 
to understand them as different activities, different temporalities,  different forms of 
organisation, as parts of a relation. Such a relational thought is what ultimately allows 
us to mediate the conflict of determinism and freedom.
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